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STATEMENT SHOWING .JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisu 
Appellate Procedure Rules 3 and 4, and also pursuant to section 78-2-2 of the Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE 
STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED UPON A MATERIAL 
BREACH BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
! he question of a material breach is a question of law, determined by the 
• . . : of corre ctness, »A< ith i I : • pre -si in lptioi l of 1 alidit} in tl le 
determinat ion made by the lower Court. Darrell J. Dikerickson & Sons. Inc. v. Magna 
Water and Sewer Improvement District, 613 I '.2d 116 ( I Jtah 1980) I his issue was 
raised w ith the lower Court throughout trial as reflected in the Transcript at page 90 
through and including 99, this being only a singular reference of m a n y noted throughout 
the Brief; 
2 APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS THAT HE IS NOT 
ONLY ENTITLED TO RESCISSION, BUT IN ADDITION THERETO, HE IS 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES THAT HE HAS SUSTAINED. 
This claim challenges a Finding of Fact, which requires that the Appellant 
marshal 1 all of tl ic evidei ice that suppoi ts the si lbject fii: v :lii: ig, c ;it i i thei i si ic ) 1 • ' 1 i. : • < t l i s 
same is an abuse of discretion by the lower Court. Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087 
1 
(Utah App. 1995). This was raised many times in the lower Court, one citation of many 
found in the Brief is Exhibit 36, found in the addendum. 
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED 
ATTORNEYS FEES TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BASIS THAT THE CLAIMS OR 
DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANT WERE WITHOUT MERIT AND NOT 
ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
This a combination question of law, and where the issue is a matter of law, the 
Appellate Court reviews the same as a matter of correctness, with no presumption of 
validity in the lower Court; and where a question of fact, the Appellate Court presumes 
the same to be valid, and the Appellant must marshall all of the evidence, and then show 
how the finding of fact was a clear abuse of discretion. Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 
1087, (Utah App. 1995) also Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). This issue 
was raised before the lower Court, and is found specifically in the Findings of Fact, item 
11. 
STATEMENT OF STATUTES 
COALVILLE CITY SIGN ORDINANCE, as existed in 1983: 
60-4-1 GENERAL SIGN PROVISIONS: 
(a) Permits: It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any sign, sign 
post, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent advertisement, arch, or any other 
structure above, over in or around any part of any street or sidewalk, in the City, without 
first obtaining permission so to do from the City Council or its delegated representative. 
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COALVILLE CITY SIGN ORDINANCE, as existed in 1984: 
CHAPTER 8, SIGNS: 
8.2 Prohibited Signs 
The following types od (sic) signs are prohibited: 
A. Off premises signs, except at listed above. 
("Above" refers to a list of signs, the off premises signs which are permitted are 
temporary political and community public events signs with a maximum 20 
square feet area. Defendant's signs are 672 square foot permanent signs.) 
8.4 Premit (sic) Required 
Unless otherwise provided therein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged until 
the sign has been approved and a permit issued by the Zoning Administrator. Sign 
permits are valid for a period of five (5) years and are subject to renewal. Application 
for sign permits shall be made to the Zoning Administrator and shall include a drawing 
showing the sign and location of the proposed sign(s). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case concerns a "Stipulation" that the parties entered into in 1983 settling a 
previously filed lawsuit. The Stipulation required the Defendant to provide sufficient 
information to the plaintiff City so that it could decide to lease or purchase a sign from 
the Defendant; that the Plaintiff would issue valid sign permits to the Defendant; that 
the Plaintiff would publish a preference for sign permits for benefit of the Defendant; 
and that the Defendant would remove signs according to a schedule. It involves 
questions of whether the City had to perform their part of the agreement to purchase the 
sign; whether the sign permits which were issued without conforming to the 
requirements of the City ordinances were valid; whether after they legislated a change in 
the Zoning Ordinance, the plaintiff was still obligated to publish the preference, or 
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whether the Zoning Ordinance change was not in good faith and constitutes a breach of 
the Stipulation; whether the defendant was required to perform when the plaintiff was in 
breach of its obligations and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees based on its 
claims that the Defendant did not raise a meritorious claim or defense. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appeal includes questions of law and fact, regarding who breached the 
contract first and whether rescission is appropriate with accompanying damages to make 
the Appellant whole. 
COURSE AND PROCEEDINGS 
The case was originally filed in 1982 in Summit County. A Stipulation was 
entered in April of 1983. Subsequently a number of motions were heard between 1986 
and 1995. This matter was tried in Coalville, in the Third District Court in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah, Judge Frank G. Noel Presiding, on August 15, 1995. 
After the Decree was entered, Defendant filed a timely Motion to Alter or Amend, 
which was denied, and thereafter the issues herein were appealed to this Court. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted judgment for the Defendant for the Plaintiffs failure to 
purchase a sign; found the sign permits valid and enforceable; stated that the Plaintiff 
was not in breach of the requirement to publish the preference since the Plaintiff 
changed its zoning ordinance making signs illegal and such zoning change was not 
prohibited by the Stipulation; yet awarded attorneys fees to the Plaintiff on the basis that 
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the defendant's claims or defenses were not maintained in good faith and were not 
meritorious; and ordered the Defendant to remove certain signs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Appellant claims that he is entitled to rescission and/or damages, based upon the 
Defendant's performance followed by the Plaintiff materially breaching the Stipulation. 
He further argues that he was not required to perform after the Plaintiff breached the 
agreement and is entitled to damages for his performance. Lastly, the Appellant claims 
error as a matter of law and as a matter of logic, on the basis that the Court cannot on 
the one hand award judgment to the Defendant on his counterclaim, and then find that 
the claims or defenses of the Defendant to be lacking merit and not maintained in good 
faith and award Plaintiff attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about February 16, 1979, Defendant approached Coalville City for 
authorization to put nine (9) billboard signs along Interstate 80, within the Coalville 
City Limits. (Note the record at page 000183.) 
2. Defendant obtained written permission ("licenses") from the Mayor of 
Coalville City, to install the subject nine (9) signs along Interstate 80. (T-317 and 
Record at 0005 and following Exhibit 32.) 
3. The Zoning ordinance in place at the time of the installation of the 
subject signs provided as follows: (Note Exhibit 30): 
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60-4-1 GENERAL SIGN PROVISIONS: 
(a) Permits: It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any 
sign, sign post, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent 
advertisement, arch, or any other structure above, over in or around any part 
of any street or sidewalk, in the City, without first obtaining permission so 
to do from the City Council or its delegated representatives. 
4. Consistent with these provisions that the Applicant get permission form 
the City Council or any of its delegated representatives, Defendant paid $144.00 for the 
permission ("licenses") to install the subject nine (9) signs. (Note Exhibit 32.) 
5. The erection of the nine signs required an extensive amount of work and 
expenditure of both time and money, and once created, the "plant" would be worth as 
much as $48,000.00 for each sign. (T-437.) 
6. After the sign licenses were acquired in writing, and after land leases 
were obtained, including access to build and maintain signs, and the sign structures 
built, certain residents in Coalville expressed harsh concern that the subject signs 
diminished the natural beauty of their town. (T-415 and following.) 
7. As a result, in 1982 the City initiated litigation to have the subject signs 
removed, on the basis that the City Council had not granted permission, and therefore 
signs were illegal. Note paragraph #11 of the Complaint, which states (R-0001): 
11. Defendant presently has constructed and erected nine (9) billboard 
signs in Coalville City, Utah, near Interstate 80 without obtaining a permit 
as required by 60-4-1(a) of the Coalville City Zoning Ordinance. 
Defendant, at the present time, still does not have the required permit. 
8. On or about August 2, 1982, the matter came on regularly for Pre-Trial 
Settlement before the Honorable Homer F. Wilinson, and the minute entry at 0015, 
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states, "This case comes now on for Pre-Trial. Counsel appeared and matter was 
discussed and a stipulation was entered into settling this cause. " 
9. Several versions of the written STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL (herein "Stipulation") were exchanged by the parties, over 
the course of months and into the following year. The same was signed finally by all 
parties by March 24,1983, and thereafter signed by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
on April 5, 1983. 
10. Terry Christiansen, who was Counsel for the Plaintiff at the time of the 
preparation of the Stipulation, did not recall at the time of trial who in fact prepared the 
same, he therefore assumed that Counsel for the Defendant prepared the same by virtue 
of the fact that Defendant's Counsel's name appeared in the upper right hand corner of 
the final version (T-63). Nevertheless, the entire record bears out that Terry 
Christiansen prepared all thirteen paragraphs of the same, and only paragraph 1 was 
changed by the parties in the several versions that were prepared between August 1982 
and March 1993. Compare page 0037 of the Record with page 0058 of the Record: 
(a) Page 0037 of the Record is an Affidavit signed by Terry Christiansen, 
which states in paragraph 3, as follows: 
3. In August, 1982, the parties entered into a settlement of the above 
action rather than proceed to trial which was set for August 31, 1982. 
During the period August 15, 1982 through March 31, 1983 the parties 
considered various drafts of the Stipulation of Dismissal and Order of 
Dismissal which drafts and consideration was necessitated by concern 
solely over paragraph 1 of the Stipulation of Dismissal 
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(b) Page 0058 of the Record is a Memorandum filed by Defendant's Counsel 
on May 28, 1986, which states: 
By way of background, the Plaintiff and the Defendant had been attempting 
for several months to achieve an acceptable stipulation to dismiss the 
above-captioned case. The Plaintiff drafted the first edition of the 
stipulation, and that edition was retyped with several minor changes by the 
Defendant and returned to the Plaintiff The order contained in the 
Stipulation and Order dismisses Plaintiff *s complaint. This Order was 
originally drafted by the Plaintiff in the first edition of the Stipulation and 
was never changed. 
11. The parties finally agreed on the terms for the Plaintiff to either purchase 
or lease a sign from the Defendant, which were the changes that were referenced by 
Terry Christiansen's Affidavit at page 0037 of the Record. (T-74 and following.) 
12. The language of the Stipulation is the drafting of the Plaintiffs counsel, 
and therefore any ambiguity in the same should be construed against the Plaintiff, 
notwithstanding the fact that the final draft has the name of Counsel for the Defendant 
in the upper right hand corner. (T-412). 
13. On March 23,1983, the Coalville City Council held a meeting, where the 
Stipulation was signed by Terry Cliristiansen as City Attorney and Mayor Johnson.. 
The minutes of this "Special Meeting" state the following (Note Exhibit 26 in 
Addendum): 
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned the billboards with All Associates. 
He mentioned the present schedule of the present billboards. The Mayor 
said that the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be used as 
a "Welcome to Coalville " sign. Al Lundgren said his costs would not be 
more than $5,200.00. If Coalville City bought the sign and took over the 
lease on the land until it runs out with C.B. Copely. Terry Christiansen 
said the bill should be itemized. He suggested that we made a decision now 
that this can be settled. He advised buying the sign so that we have a 
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chance of getting the rest of the signs down, in the future. If we don V buy 
the sign, we will he back in litigation and with our present zoning 
ordinances, we would probably lose. If the City buys the sign then they will 
have to maintain it. As long as the contract and lease on the property. 
Terry Christiansen said we have four choices: 1. Sign the agreement and 
buy the sign so that all of the signs will be down in 20 years, 2. Go with the 
lawsuit that we will probably lose. Leaving the signs up indefinitely. 3. 
Drop the lawsuit and the signs will be up as long as he wants them, or 4. 
Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made the motion that we purchase the sign 
in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. Sargent, second the motion. All 
Ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The Mavor and Attorney signed the 
Order of Dismissal. (Emphasis added.) 
14. About the same time that the Stipulation was signed by the Mayor and 
Terry Christiansen, the Defendant withdrew his signature and agreement to be bound by 
the Stipulation. His counsel submitted a letter to Plaintiffs counsel withdrawing the 
Defendant's acceptance of the agreement. (T-120.) 
15. In late 1983 the City amended its zoning ordinance and prohibited off 
premise signs, and appointed a zoning administrator who was responsible for issuing 
permits. The ordinance did not contain a "preference" for permits for Defendant. 
(Addendum, Coalville Sign Ordinance, Chapter 8.) 
16. Defendant was unaware that the Stipulation was submitted to the Court 
and that the Court accepted it on April 15, 1983, and that the Plaintiff considered it 
valid, until he received a demand letter from Terry Christiansen in 1986 to remove a 
sign along the freeway as contemplated in the Stipulation. Defendant refused, because 
the Plaintiff had never leased or purchased the sign as required in Paragraph 1 of the 
Stipulation and because he thought the Stipulation was not in effect. (T-123.) 
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17. The City brought an Order to Show Cause, and the Defendant was 
required to remove a sign, notwithstanding the fact that the City had never complied 
with the subject Stipulation to either lease or purchase the sign pursuant to the 
Stipulation paragraph 1. (R-00334 and following.) 
18. Wholly independent o f the duty of the City to lease or purchase a sign 
from the Defendant, the Defendant contracted with the Camber of Commerce to provide 
sign space for the sum of $600.00. (T-155 and following.) 
19. Defendant took a loss to build and erect the sign from the Chamber of 
Commerce, however he did it for public relations reasons. (T-149 and T-154.) 
20. Even though the Plaintiff had nothing to do with the sign for the 
Chamber of Commerce, Plaintiff sought and obtained a Court Order restraining the 
Defendant from taking down the Chamber sign. (T-141 and following.) 
21. The terms and conditions between the Defendant and the Chamber of 
Commerce allowed the Defendant to remove the sign face at anytime, and so the 
Defendant removed the sign face, but only after the Plaintiff acknowledge that it was 
not their sign and they had no interest in the same. (T-149, T-150 and T-160.) 
22. A number of motions and petitions were filed by each party, but instead 
of ruling on them, the court scheduled trial before the Honorable Frank Noel, District 
Court Judge, on August 15 and 16, 1995. (R-0091 and following.) 
23. The plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was in contempt for taking 
down the Chamber sign and requested attorneys fees for the various times they had to 
bring the Defendant before the Court for his refusal to remove the subject signs. The 
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Defendant claimed that he was entitled to rescission on the Stipulation for the material 
breach by the Plaintiff, and for damages stemming from the same. (Record 0091-95 and 
R-0106-0110.) 
ARGUMENT ONE: DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF 
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES BASED UPON A 
MATERIAL BREACH BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
Appellants submit that they are entitled to rescission of the Stipulation on the 
basis that the Plaintiff/Appellee breached every essential term of the Stipulation. A 
careful review of the matter will reflect that there were several material elements of 
the Stipulation that the Plaintiff was to perform, and that Plaintiff in fact did not 
perform a single one. These facts are clear and undisputed in the record and the trial 
court erred by ignoring these undisputed facts. 
A. The Permission Granted by the City in 1979 Was Valid, but the City 
Wanted the Signs Removed for Political Reasons and Did Not Act in Good 
Faith. 
In 1979, Mr. Lundgren, doing business as All Associates, Inc. approached the 
City of Coalville to install nine (9) billboards along Interstate 80, within the 
Coalville City limits (T-319). Consistent with the sign ordinance at the time, he 
obtained written permission in the form of "licenses" from the Mayor Ball of 
Coalville City and paid the license fee for nine (9) signs. 
Exhibit 30, included in the addendum, states the following: 
11 
60-4-1(a): Permits. It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or 
construct any sign, signpost, sign board, wood or metal awning, permanent 
advertisement, arch or any other structure above, over, in or around any 
part of any street or sidewalk in the City, without first obtaining permission 
so to do from the City Council or its delegated representatives. 
Accordingly, the Defendant could obtain "permission" from the City council 
or any of its "delegated representatives". Clearly, the Mayor could bind the City, 
regarding the signs as one of the "delegated representatives." As noted in Exhibit 32, 
included in the Addendum, Mr. Lundgren paid $144.00 for nine (9) sign licenses. 
After spending substantial sums to acquire the land leases, paying for 
permits/licenses, and doing all of the legwork, the Defendant built nine (9) signs or 
the "plant." (T-356, T-314, and T-346.) 
After the Defendant installed the signs, certain individuals did not want the 
town 'cluttered' with the signs, and insisted with the City Council that the signs 
come down. (T-415-416.) The City of Coalville then initialed litigation to force the 
removal of the subject signs. Record at 0001-0004. Thereafter, the parties entered 
into the Stipulation. 
It is most important to note that the Minutes of the City Council confirms in 
two different places that the City of Coalville did not expect to win the litigation. 
This supports Defendant's claim that the City was willing to put anything into the 
Stipulation, requiring the subject signs to come down, when Plaintiff had no 
intention to comply with the Stipulation in good faith. 
// 
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B. The Stipulation Was Drafted by the Plaintiff and Should Be Construed 
Against It. 
Note Exhibit 26, an excerpt with Terry Christiansen on the stand testifying 
regarding the Minutes of the City Council: 
Q. Pickup there where it says Terry Christiansen said, would you read 
that briefly to the Court? 
A. "Terry Christiansen said we have four choices. One, signing the 
agreement for the sign so all the signs will be down in 20 years. Two, 
go to the lawsuit that we 7/ probably lose, leaving the signs up 
indefinitely. Three, dropping the lawsuit and the signs will be up as 
long as he wants then, or four, condemn them. 
According to the sworn statement of Terry Christiansen in his Affidavit 
found at page 0037, Terry Christiansen in fact drafted the entire Stipulation and the 
Defendant only changed a few words in the same. (Plaintiff Exhibit 1 included in the 
addendum.) 
It is widely accepted that any ambiguity in the Stipulation should be resolved 
in favor of the other party. Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 
798, 807 (Utah 1992). Plaintiff substantially drafted the document. 
C. The City Specifically Understood and Agreed to the Terms of the 
Stipulation. 
Not only did Plaintiffs Counsel draft the Stipulation but the whole City 
Council officially approved it. The transcript at page 217 states: 
Q. And is it fair to say that the City Council read the Stipulation before 
you were authorized to sign on behalf of Coalville City? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And so how many people of the City Council read Exhibit 1 before 
you signed it. 
A I would say all of them did. 
Q. Let me focus on my question. Did you discuss it in the City Council? 
A, We discussed the Stipulation. 
Q. The terms of the stipulation? 
A. The terms of the stipulation were discussed. 
Q, All 13 paragraphs ? 
A. All 13 paragraphs. 
Q. The people of the city council when this was passed were fairly 
educated people that would understand all that's in the document, 
would they not, as far as you know? 
A. They weren 7 all lawyers, no. 
Q. Fairly educated people, though? They were public officials in the city 
and they, at least, knew what they wanted to do and what they were 
doing because you were binding the city when you signed the, did you 
not? 
A. Right. But to say they were educated, that *s a broad term. 
D. The City Breached its Duty to Purchase or Lease a Sign. 
As reflected in Exhibit 26, Coalville City passed a motion to purchase a sign 
from the Defendant, in order to meet its obligations of paragraph 1 of the Stipulation. 
This commitment to buy a sign from the Defendant was confirmed by Terry 
Christiansen at page 85 of the transcript, and Mayor Johnson stated on page 257 of 
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the transcript, "He insisted that it being in there, yes. And we agreed to buy the 
sign," 
Appellant respectfully submits that it is critical for the Court to note, that 
even though the City of Coalville agreed to purchase the sign, it never did, and that 
failure was held by Judge Frank Noel to be a breach of the agreement between the 
parties, and no one appealed from that part of the decision by the lower court. The 
Notice of Appeal filed by the Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross Appellant, states: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff Coalville City, cross-
appeals to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure that portion of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree dated October 26, 1995 that awarded the Defendant Alvin 
R. Lundgren pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff further seeks award of 
additional attorney's fees incurred in this appeal 
Dated this 1st day of February, 1996. 
/s/KiraE. Macfarlane 
Kir a E. Macfarlane 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
Plaintiff breached the contract and agreement between the parties, in the 
Stipulation paragraph 1, and is not contesting that fact before this Court. 
E. The City Agreed to Issue Permits for the Signs, but the Permits Which 
Were Issued Were Not in Compliance with the Ordinances of the City; Are 
Therefore Invalid; and the City Is in Breach of the Stipulation for Failure to 
Issue Valid Permits, Which Resulted in Damages to the Defendant. 
Stipulation paragraphs 2 through 9 inclusive, have identical language calling 
for the Plaintiff to issue sign permits to the Defendant permitting the Defendant to 
maintain the signs until certain times when they would be removed. 
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As noted above, the "licenses" that the Defendant acquired in 1979-1981 
from the Mayor of Coalville, were challenged by Plaintiff as being defective because 
the City Council did not approve them. (Note Complaint at 001 and following.) 
However, the plain language of the Coalville City Zoning Ordinance at 60-4-01(a), 
states that "It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or construct any sign... 
without first obtaining permission to do so from the City Council or its delegated 
representatives. " (Emphasis added.) 
This ordinance was in effect at the time of the signing of the Stipulation, 
however the law was changed after this Stipulation was signed. (T. at 232.) It is 
critical to note that this language was substantially changed to the point that not just 
any delegated representative could sign the requisite permits, but only the "Zoning 
Administrator". (Chapter 8.4, Coalville Sign Ordinance, Exhibit 31.) 
As noted in Exhibit 31, which is attached in the Addendum is the following: 
Chapter 8, SIGNS: 
8.4 Premit (sic) Required 
Unless otherwise provided herein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or 
enlarged until the sign has been approved and a permit issued by the 
Zoning Administrator. Sign permits are valid for a period of five (5) years 
and are subject to renewal. Application for sign permits shall be made to 
the Zoning Administrator and shall include a drawing showing the design 
and location of the proposed sign(s). 
Hence, the old ordinance required permission from the City Council or its 
delegated representatives, whereas the new ordinance required that the permit "shall" 
be issued by the "Zoning Administrator." The Zoning Administrator was apparently 
William M. Judd, (as reflected in Exhibit 33, which is included in the addendum) as 
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he approved the sign for Summit Mercantile, according to the official minutes of the 
City Council. 
The permits ostensibly issued to conform to the Stipulation were prepared by 
Mayor Johnson and his secretary, neither of which were Zoning Administrators. (T 
at page 239.) 
The new ordinance also prohibited off-premises signs1. (Chapter 8.1, 8.2 
Coalville Sign Ordinance, Addendum) The Defendant's signs are off-premises 
signs, also known as billboards. (Exhibit 12.) 
Therefore the Plaintiff breached each and every paragraph from 2 through 9 
inclusive, as no Zoning Administrator ever issued Mr. Lundgren any permits, and the 
new ordinance prohibited off-premise signs. The permits were not and are not valid. 
In fact, Mayor Johnson testified that he intentionally waited until the new 
ordinance went into effect before he purported to issue permits to the Defendant. (T-
28 and following also note T at 220 and following.) He testified at trial that he not 
only waited until 1985 to issue the alleged permits, but he had no knowledge whether 
these "permits" were ever delivered to the Defendant at any time. (Note the 
Transcript at page 220 and following.) 
When pressed regarding not being authorized to issue permits, and that only 
the Zoning Administrator was authorized by law to issued the subject permits, Mayor 
Johnson testified on page 239 as follows: 
1
 The 'new' sign ordinance adopted in 1983 and effective in 1984 prohibited off premises signs 
except for temporary political and community public event signs not to exceed 20 square feet of sign area. 
Defendant's signs are permanent structures with 672 square feet of sign area. 
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/ understand what you 're getting at and I don 7 see anything here which 
says that the mayor should take and sign them. If I signed them in 
ignorance of the law, then that's what I did. I signed them at the advice of 
my attorney and the city council at the time. 
However the Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the City Council ever 
considered the permits, neither did the City Attorney testify that he told the Mayor to 
sign the permits. Mayor Johnson said that he prepared the form and had the 
secretary type them up. That is all that happened. He never even considered the new 
ordinance. 
Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation states: 
10. It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
that the Defendant will remove signs for which the Defendant does not have 
a permit, on or before the expiration of the permit period taking into 
considerations the weather conditions of Coalville, Utah. 
Lundgren testified at trial that the permits were not delivered until 1986, after 
the City commenced an action to have a sign removed. Paragraph 10 requires the 
Defendant to take down a sign for which he did not have the permits contemplated in 
paragraphs 2 though 9 inclusive, yet the sign required to come down in 1985 
(paragraph 2) did not even get a permit until after the date it was supposed to come 
down. (Exhibit 12.) 
The issue of materiality in not getting valid permits was testified to, without 
contradiction or refutation by the Defendant, beginning at page 319 and following. 
It is critical to note that the City of Coalville did not ever issue any valid 
permits, after they expressly agreed to do so as contemplated in Stipulation 
paragraphs 2 through 9 inclusive, the bogus permits they claimed to have issued long 
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after the signing of the Stipulation, on their very terms violated the express 
agreement between the parties. The parties expressly agreed in paragraph 12, that 
the Defendant could solely determine which signs would come down when: 
12. It is agreed and understood that the Defendant may apply the 
permits granted herein to the existing sign structures and locations 
individually as the Defendant deems appropriate, and that the Plaintiff will 
not control which permit is applied to which sign. 
However, as noted in Exhibit 12, the bogus permits expressly called for the 
signs to come down on a schedule determined by the City, in direct contradiction to 
the agreement between the parties. Each of the permits has an expiration date 
inserted by the Mayor, not the Defendant. 
Hence, the Plaintiff breached paragraphs 2 through 12 inclusive in that they 
never issued a single valid permit, the did not attempt to issue even the bogus permits 
until well after the fact, and lastly, the bogus permits expressly called for the signs to 
come down in order as the City directed, and not as agreed to by the parties. 
The City argued before the lower Court at 322, that they did not challenge the 
permits and therefore they are de facto valid. The problem with this line of 
reasoning is that the Defendant was compelled to take the matter back to the Court, 
to obtain a Court Order to get that for which he bargained. Furthermore and more 
importantly the Defendant sustained damages during the time that the bogus permits 
were in dispute. Mr. Lundgren testified on page 320 as follows: 
After the Stipulation was signed, say in 1986, and through probably today, 
the fact that we were in a battle with the City of the validity of the permits 
and other issues; our ability to sell signs, particularly in the Coalville area, 
has been severely hampered. 
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On page 323, Mr. Lundgren testified that the questions over the bogus 
permits were a lingering problem and affected him financially, like a "lis pendens" 
does to real property. 
It is critical for this Court to note that there was no evidence to the contrary, 
and no refutation whatsoever to any of the testimony regarding the affect that it had 
on the Defendant and the damages he sustained. 
F. The City Breached its Promise to Publish a Preference, and Changed the 
Zoning Ordinance, All in Bad Faith. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the most bold and flagrant violation of the 
Plaintiff Coalville City's obligation to act in good faith and fair dealing, is in 
reference to paragraph 13 of the Stipulation which reads: 
13. It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that 
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue 
of its existing signs, will have priority over any applicant who does not have 
an existing sign, and the Plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps are 
necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made a part of the 
published sign policy of the Plaintiff City. 
As Noted at page 0037, and 0058 of the Record, Counsel for the Plaintiff 
drafted this provision of the Stipulation, without any modification whatsoever by the 
Defendant. 
To understand the real bad faith by Coalville City, it must be remembered 
that the City Council minutes reflect in two places in Exhibit 26, that the City was in 
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a lawsuit that they did not expect to win, and so they expressly stated we must agree 
to these terms, or the signs are going to stay up indefinitely. 
On page 93 of the Transcript, Mr. Christiansen, testified as follows: 
Q. You talked here this morning about the notion that Coalville City was 
contemplating putting together a new code, correct? 
A. Correct? 
Q. And here, we are talking about the priority of the Plaintiff going into 
the published sign policy, would they be the same? 
A. Yes. 
When questioned further about the language in the Stipulation, Terry 
Christiansen testified beginning on page 94 as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Walsh) It was your intent, was it not, that the defendant 
was going to be published in the new code coming up from zoning? 
A. I can't imagine that the defendant's name would be there. Okay? 
Obviously, the zoning code would deal with signs; but I can't imagine 
that the code itself would put his name in ti because codes are general 
laws. And I've never seen a code where that took place. 
Q. So, where were they going to publish it? 
A. I don 7 really know; it could be the code or it could be a policy. 
Q. Have the policy. That wouldn 7 be in the code? 
A. Possibly. 
Q. Says they 're going to t(insure that this priority " would be published. 
Can you tell me what you did in reference to that? 
A. I can't. 
Q. Tell me what the City did in reference to that? 
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A. leant 
Q. But again, it is your testimony that that [publishedpreference] was 
clearly material to the defendant? 
A. As was every other paragraph. 
Appellant submits that the Plaintiff not only breached all material elements of 
the second half of their duties as contemplated in paragraph 13 of the Stipulation, but 
they even more boldly and flagrantly breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the breach of the first half of paragraph 13. 
The first paragraph of 13 reads: 
13. It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that 
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue 
of its existing signs, will have apriority over any applicant who does not 
have an existing sign. . . 
Mr. Lundgren testified beginning page 324 of the Transcript in answer to the 
question as to whether this provision was important as follows: 
This whole paragraph was of the utmost concern to us. We were giving up 
our advertising signs and this was our business. We had at this time, maybe 
eleven or twelve locations with six of them being at risk and going to be 
removed. We needed assurances that number one, if we were going to take 
the signs down, we didn 7 want to get into a situation where we had to 
remove a sign and then somebody could come up in back of us and get a 
permit and application from the City and replace us. And the City said 
we 're going to give you all the assurances that we can possibly give you 
that you have first option on any sign location that comes available. You We 
going to take your sign down. And if we allow them to go back in, you We 
the first in line. 
Q. Now, are you talking about billboards on Interstate 80? 
A. I don't think we were talking about billboards on Interstate 90. We were 
trading off all of our advertising business and income for the right to put up 
any new sign or losing the advertising and we know that. We \e got to have 
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some rights to put up and replace that business with something else. And it 
wasn V limited to just billboard signs or off-premise signs, or signs on 1-80. It 
was a very broad brush, and what we bargained for to compensate for every 
thing that we are losing. 
When asked how long the benefits intended to flow to the Defendant, 
stemming from paragraph 13 on page 332, Defendant stated: 
Our understanding is it would go on indefinitely. In typical circumstances, 
you put a billboard up and it stays up indefinitely. We were giving up our 
right and changing that for a term of years for another indefinite right. 
All of this was confirmed by the testimony of Denver Snuffer beginning at 
page 418 and following, and particular the quid-pro-quo that the Defendant was 
getting versus what he was giving up. 
Plaintiff, instead of acting with good faith and fair dealing, intentionally 
refused to give the Defendant any priority of any kind, rather they prepared a new 
zoning code, and then they put in the code, not that what Lundgren had bargained 
for, but that billboard signs would not be allowed. (Note the Transcript at page 247.) 
G. The Terms of the Stipulation Were Material to the Agreement Between 
the Parties and the Stipulation Would Not Have Been Agreed to Without the 
Material Terms, and the City Acted in Bad Faith in Entering into and 
Enforcing its Obligations under the Stipulation. 
Because Appellant requests this Court to order the rescission of the 
Stipulation; Appellant submits that every witness agreed that each of the thirteen (13) 
paragraphs of the Stipulation was material. Plaintiffs Counsel Terry Christiansen, 
testified on page 90 as follows: 
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Q. Do you remember discussions as to how material that was to the 
defendant? 
A. Not discussions. I just remember that it was material otherwise, it 
wouldn 't be there. 
On page 92, under cross-examination, Terry Christiansen stated: 
Q. It is fair to say, Mr. Christiansen, that that was material to the 
defendant, was it not? 
A. Oh, Vm sure every paragraph in there was material. 
Again on page 96, Terry Christiansen testified as follows: 
Q. But again, is it your testimony that that was clearly material to the 
defendant? 
A. As was every other paragraph. 
Not only did Plaintiffs Counsel Terry Christiansen testify as to the 
materiality of the provision of the Stipulation to the Defendant, so did the Mayor 
who signed the Stipulation, when he testified on page 257, of how the Defendant 
insisted on certain terms in the Stipulation. 
Mr. Lundgren testified as to the materiality of paragraph 1 in the stipulation 
at page 304. On page 313 of the Transcript, Mr. Lundgren testified as to how 
material the valid permits were to him, and then at page 316 and following he 
testified as to how these bogus permits issued by the City affected the marketability 
of the signs, etc. At page 324, Mr. Lundgren testified as to the importance of 
paragraph 13, when he stated, "This whole paragraph was of utmost concern to us. 
We were giving up our advertising signs and this was our business. . . " 
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Apparently the City put anything into this Stipulation with no intent of ever 
following through on their side of the agreement, just as long a the signs came down. 
Note for example, paragraph 13, as drafted by Plaintiffs Counsel, 
13. It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that 
if the Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue 
of its existing signs, will have priority over any applicant who does not have 
an existing sign, and the Plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps are 
necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made apart of the 
published sign policy of the Plaintiff City. (Emphasis added.) 
This is what the City wrote into the agreement to get the signs to come down, 
otherwise they were facing litigation that they expected to lose and the signs would 
remain indefinitely. However, when it came to the time for performance, both City 
Attorney Christiansen and Mayor Johnson each testified that they did not 
"understand" what this meant, as it would be 'really heavy if it meant being granted a 
priority over any applicant, and that the priority would be published in the official 
sign policy.' (Note the Transcript at 93 and following.) 
On page 222 of the Transcript Mayor Merlyn Johnson testified regarding 
paragraph 13, where it states, "It is agreed and understood. . . ", as follows: 
Q. So, I understand, the [new zoning] ordinance went into place in 1984, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And when we talk here in Paragraph IS, about a "published sign 
policy" what did that mean to you then? 
A. I don 7 know what a sign policy is. 
Q. You have no idea of what this was, just a few inches above your own 
signature? Is that what you 're telling the Court. 
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A. That's what I'm telling the Court. 
The Mayor goes on to testify that there were many drafts of the agreement, and many 
discussions with their Attorney as to terms and conditions of settling this lawsuit, 
and that they openly admitted in City Council that they were going to lose. 
Appellant must admit, even now, that to suggest that one is going to get an 
official priority over any applicant that comes in to Coalville City for a sign permit, 
coupled with an agreement to be published in the official sign policy with the subject 
priority, is extraordinary, perhaps beyond what the City may legitimately do. In 
considering what to do at this point, rescission is the only appropriate remedy, 
coupled with the necessary damages to put the parties back where they were before 
the meaningless Stipulation that was prepared by the Plaintiffs Counsel was signed. 
Plaintiff started in the negotiations in 1983 - giving up nothing, as they fully 
expected to lose the lawsuit that they had filed, as reflected in the Official City 
Council Minutes. Then they engage in negotiations calling for them to do various 
things that they commit to under the notion that it is "agreed and understood". 
However, when it is time to perform, they come back and say: 
We agreed to buy a sign and didn 7. So what? We agreed to issue permits, 
but it turned out that we intentionally waited until the Mayor could no longer 
legally issue them2, but he issued them anyway without even a reference to 
the new ordinance, and even then the bogus permits called for a time certain 
for the signs to come down, when the parties expressly agreed to the 
contrary, not to mention that we never even delivered them to the Defendant 
until after the time the first sign was to come down. So what? We promised 
2
 Note the permits are dated 1985, and the new zoning ordinance was effective in 1984, therefore 
not even the Zoning Administrator could legally issue the permits which were for billboard signs, prohibited in the 
1984 zoning ordinance. Chapter 8.1, 8.2 Coalville Sign Ordinance, 1984, Addendum. 
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to give the defendant apriority, and publish this priority in the official sign 
policy. We know we agreed and understood these terms, but now we are 
saying it can 7 mean what it says on the one hand, yet on the other, if it does 
mean that, then we don Y know what it means. Besides, we don Y have to 
because we changed the ordinance. So what? " (T-87, T-93 and following, 
andT-221 and following.) (Paraphrased.) 
After totally ignoring everything in the Stipulation, the Plaintiff continued to 
haul the Defendant before the Court to force the signs to come down pursuant to the 
Stipulation. Such actions are patent bad faith. At a minimum the City should have 
tendered some sort of performance. The only thing the City did was to issue illegal 
permits years after signing the Stipulation. Then the trial court "rewarded" Plaintiff 
its attorneys fees for doing so. The trial court erred. 
H. The Law Enforces a Stipulation as a Contract, Which Charges Any 
Ambiguity to the Drafter, and Any Material Breach Allows for Rescission and 
Damages. 
When the parties signed the Stipulation, calling for each of the parties to 
perform certain duties, they signed a compromise and settlement which constituted 
an executory accord or a contract. L & A Drywall. Inc. v. Witmore Construction 
Co.. 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980); Cox Construction Company v. State Road 
Commission, 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978). 
Any ambiguity in the Stipulation between the parties, must be construed 
against the drafter of the document. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah). 
The Plaintiffs attorney drafted the Stipulation, with only changes to paragraph 1 by 
the parties, the remaining twelve (12) paragraphs were substantially unchanged. 
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The contract must be construed in light of the reasonable expectations of the 
parties as evidenced by the purpose and language of the contract. Nixon and Nixon. 
Inc. v. John New & Associates. 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982); HCA Health Services of 
Utah. Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities. 843 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1993), also Maack v. 
Resource Design & Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994). The 
expectation of these parties manifest in the Stipulation is that the Plaintiff expected 
(a) to be able to buy or lease a sign, and (b) that all of the signs would be removed 
over a period of years. The Defendant expected that he would get (a) the financial 
and prestige benefits from the purchase or lease of a sign by the City; (b) valid 
permits which could not be contested by the City, and which had marketability; (c) 
the financial value and prestige from having a preference published in the sign 
ordinances giving him the first right to future sign permits. 
Whether a particular breach is material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed 
by the Appellate Court, with no presumption of correctness. Darrell J. Didericksen 
& Sons. Inc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist.. 613 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1980); McCarren v. Merrill. 389 P.2d 732 (Utah, 1964) and Saunders v. Sharp. 840 
P.2d 796 (Utah App. 1992). All of the participating parties to the creation of the 
Stipulation testified that each of the thirteen (13) paragraphs of the Stipulation were 
material, and that the Stipulation would not have been signed without each of them. 
The testimony is clear and unrefuted that the City in one way or another failed to 
perform or expressly breached each of its duties under the Stipulation. 
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The Court is to determine as a matter of law, whether there is any ambiguity 
in the contract and if there is no ambiguity in the contract, the Court is not to allow 
extrinsic evidence to modify or change the express terms. If however, there is some 
ambiguity then extrinsic evidence is allowed, but only to clarity the ambiguity. 
Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). Here, the contract was clear and 
unambiguous. It was drafted the City attorney, and then read and approved by the 
City Council and by the Court.3 
In the larger sense this Stipulation, by virtue of the accompanying Court 
approval, became the law of the case, and became an Order from the Court, and 
therefore any interpretation of the same is clearly a question of law, reviewed by this 
Court for correctness without any presumption of validity. Provo City Corp. v. 
Nielson Scott Co. 699 P.2d 803, (Utah, 1979) also Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 
714 (Utah, 1985). 
As stated above, and as testified at the same of trial, the Plaintiff got what it 
wanted in this action, i.e., the signs would come down. Frankly a goal that the City 
openly admitted in the official City Council Meeting, one that it did not expect to 
obtain by the lawsuit that it had filed. On the other hand, the Defendant gave up his 
3
 If there is any ambiguity it is whether the language of paragraph thirteen (13) regarding priority 
for permits is limited to permits for off-premise signs or includes all sign permits. The language is broad, and 
unrestricted. The City did not limit in any manner the type of signs in the preference. However, the trial court 
found that the preference applied only to off-premise signs. This was error on part of the trial court, which should 
have relied on the language of the Stipulation, not extrinsic testimony. Regardless of this possible ambiguity, the 
outcome of this appeal is not substantially affected if the Court finds that the City is in material breach and orders 
rescission and damages to restore the Defendant to substantially the same condition as he would have been without 
the Stipulation. 
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very valuable signs in exchange for the City purchasing a sign from Defendant; 
getting valid permits; a priority over any other applicants for signs in the area, and a 
published priority in the official sign policy for Plaintiff City. Yet, he got nothing 
for which he bargained. He is entitled to rescission. 
What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify rescission is not easily 
reduced to precise statement, but certainly a failure of performance which 
"defeats the very object of the contract" or "(is) of such prime importance 
that the contract would not have been made if default in the particular had 
been contemplated" is a material failure. Polvglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 
591 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1979). 
The participating drafters of the Stipulation each agreed that the thirteen paragraphs 
were material. If the Defendant did not obtain the benefit from a single paragraph, 
the purposes of the Stipulation would have been materially breached. Here the 
Plaintiff breached each of its obligations, and the Defendant got virtually nothing for 
his performance. 
When Mayor Johnson filed suit in 1982 he was correct in his conclusion that 
the City cannot overlook its own ordinances. In Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 
827 P.2d 212 (Utah, 1992), this Court ruled that the county administrative officials 
may not forfeit the power of enforcement by disregarding an ordinance. In Salt Lake 
County v. Katchner. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1979) and Town of Alta v. Ben Hame 
Corp.. 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992) the Appellate Courts held that actions of a 
city representative do not preclude the city of a municipality from enforcing its own 
ordinances. This case law places the Defendant in the awkward position of having 
permits which were issued in violation of the city ordinances, and leaves the 
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Defendant at the mercy of any subsequent administration which may elect to 
challenge the permits. Here, Plaintiff Coalville City argues that they never 
challenged their own bogus permits and therefore is excused from issuing valid 
permits. That is a self serving argument. There is nothing which prevents a 
subsequent administration from discovering that the permits were issued in violation 
of the published ordinance and filing suit. In fact the subsequent administration may 
be required to enforce its ordinances regardless of the action of the administrator. 
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra. 
In Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 
1992) the Court of appeals held that the County could not repudiate its own contract, 
even where they felt that the contract did not conform to their normal procedures. 
Therefore the Plaintiff cannot simply complain that they do not understand, or that it 
is irregular or unusual; the Plaintiff is compelled to comply with its contract. They 
were compelled to either purchase the sign, issue valid permits and publish the 
preference or stand in material breach of their agreement. 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an 
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been 
a material breach of the contract by the other party. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 
591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
Rescission is a restitutionary remedy which attempts to restore the parties to 
the status quo to the extent possible or as demanded by the equities in the case. 
Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986); Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 
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799 P.2d 716, 731 (Utah App. 1990). Furthermore, it is the breaching party who 
bears whatever burden is necessary to restore the offended party: 
It has also been said that where a contract is not performed, the party who is 
guilty of the first breach is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability 
for the nonperformance. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 281, 28 Utah 2d 134 
(Utah 1972). 
This case is unique in that the Stipulation is cast so that its performance by 
the Defendant actually work to his disadvantage, i.e., he must remove signs. (The 
"quid pro quo" was that the Defendant expected that the required performance by the 
Plaintiff would provide other opportunities to offset the loss of the signs.) Here he 
removed signs, but received absolutely no offsetting benefit. To restore the 
defendants to the pre-Stipulation status initially requires (1) re-installation of their 
removed signs; and (2) compensation for the lost income for the period of time the 
signs are down. The matter is complicated since the plaintiff changed its sign 
ordinances and made these signs illegal. Therefore, the Court must either order the 
plaintiff to take the appropriate action to allow the signs to be legally reinstalled; or 
alternately, at a minimum, order the plaintiff to pay the defendant the reasonable 
market value of its signs (plus the lost income for the period of time the signs were 
down). While this later measure does not fully compensate the Defendant since he is 
deprived the future income off of the signs, it is the most reasonable approximation 
of the damages. See, Argument Two. 
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I. The Plaintiff Violated the Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Defendant respectfully submits that there is clearly an intentional breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the case of Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 899 P.2d 445 at 451 (Utah App. 
1994), the Court of Appeals summarized the duty in every contact, to act in good 
faith and with fair dealing: 
Resource Management. 706 P.2d at 1038 (contract rights must be exercised 
in reasonable manner and in good faith); Ted R. Brown. 753 P.2d at 970 
( "every contract imposes a duty on the parties to exercise their contractual 
rights and perform their contractual obligations reasonably"); Leigh 
Furniture. 657 P.2d at 311 (party breaches covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing if it fails to exercise all its rights under contract reasonably);.. 
This Court in 1993, defined substantial performance in the case of Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. Of Transportation. 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah, 1993): 
Substantial performance exists "where there has been no willful 
departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission in essential 
points', and the contract has been honestly and faithfully performed in its 
material and substantial particulars. " Blacks Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 
1979). A party has substantially performed when "the only variance from 
the strict and literal performance consists of technical or unimportant 
omissions or defects ". Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 858 
P.2datl370. 
Here there was a "willful departure from the terms of the contract" and it was 
not "honestly and faithfully performed in its material and substantial particulars'' 
rather it was purposefully and intentionally breached: (a) by not purchasing the sign; 
(b) waiting until the sign permits were illegal and then issuing permits which did not 
even facially comply with the ordinance; (c) by the City passing an ordinance that 
disallowed off-premise signs, and therefore the City thought it did not have to grant 
33 
the priority to Defendant as expressly agreed, nor did they have to publish this 
subject priority in the published sign policy. The official actions of the Plaintiff City 
were not only willful but in direct violation of the covenant to act in good faith and 
with fair dealing. 
Defendant submits that it is entitled to rescission of the Stipulation, with the 
matter be remanded to the District Court to determine damages in order to put the 
Defendant back into the position where he was before the Stipulation was entered 
into, and where that can not be accomplished, then the Defendant should be awarded 
such damages as will fairly compensate him, including his attorney fees arising from 
the Plaintiffs lack of good faith pursuctnt to Section 78-2-2, UCA. 
II. ARGUMENT TWO: APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS 
THAT HE IS NOT ONLY ENTITLED TO RESCISSION, BUT IN ADDITION 
THERETO HE IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES THAT HE HAS SUSTAINED. 
A. Where There Is a Material Breach by the Plaintiff the Defendant Is Not 
Required to Perform and the Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Bring an Action for the 
Defendant to Perform. 
Appellant claims a right to be made whole for the damages that he has 
sustained in addition to the remedy of rescission. He claims that he is entitled to 
those damages that he has sustained for having to remove certain signs, as well as a 
voiding of the contract between the parties. 
In the case of Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1979), 
This Court stated on page 451 as follows: 
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As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right to rescission and 
an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where 
there has been a material breach of contract by the other party. 
In this action, it is clear that the Plaintiff breached the contract and agreement 
as reflected in the Stipulation, regarding paragraph 1, for which the Court awarded 
judgment to the Defendant in the amount of $3,890.00, as reflected in paragraph 1 of 
the Decree: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
I. Defendant is awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount 
of~ $3,890.00 on account of Plaintiff's Default in failing to purchase a sign 
from the Defendant. Defendant is awarded prejudgment interest from 
January I, 1985 at the rate of 10% per annum. 
Defendant submits that when the Plaintiff is the first to materially breach the 
contract and agreement of the parties they are precluded from thereafter requiring 
performance by the Defendant. 
In the case Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp.. 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App. 
1994) at page 301 in the following: 
The law is well settled that the material breach by one party to a contract 
excuses further performance by the nonbreaching part. See Sanders v. 
Sharp. 840 P. 2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside Nursery. 
787 P. 2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990). Also a party seeing to enforce a 
contract must prove performance of its own obligations under the contract. 
Malotv.Hadlev. 86 Or. App. 687, 740 P.2d 804, 805-806 (1987). See Bell 
v. Elder. 782 P. 2d 545, 548 (Utah App. 1989). The jury concluded that 
Holbrook fully performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreements. 
In contract, Firemaster was found to have materially breached the 
Franchise Agreement, thereby losing its right to enforce them against 
Holbrook. As the Franchise Agreements specifically incorporated the 
promissory notes, the notes are an integral part of the Franchise 
Agreements. Therefore, given Firemaster's material breach, Holbrook was 
properly excused from continued payment on the promissory notes. 
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In the case of Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), at page 
157 is the following: 
The substantial performance defense has been explained as follows: "As a 
rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of a contract 
cannot complaint if the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can 
neither insist on performance by the other party nor maintain an action 
against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform. " Fernandez v. 
Purdue. 30 Utah 2d 389, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (1974) (Ellett, J. Dissenting) 
(quoting 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts Sec. 365). See Parr ell J. Diderickson & 
Sons v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist.. 613 P. 2d 1116, 1119 
(Utah, 1980); Wags taffy. Remco. Inc.. 540 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiff never had the right to file its motion to compel in 1986 or at any time 
thereafter because they were already in material breach. Also note Jackson v. Rich. 
499 P.2d 279 (Utah 1972). 
Whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant were the first to breach the Stipulation 
is not even at issue before this Court. It is clear that the Plaintiff was the first to 
materially breach. The Defendant perfarmed as he was required to by providing 
information sufficient for the Plaintiff 1o make its determination to purchase. That 
decision was made when the Plaintiff signed the Stipulation on March 24, 1983. 
Judge Noel confirmed that breach and awarded judgment against the Plaintiff and for 
the Defendant in the sum of $3,890.00, plus 10% interest from January 1, 1985. 
Once the Plaintiff failed and refused to perform its obligations under the 
Stipulation, the Defendant was entitled to withhold performance, and in fact 
eventually refused to perform, based upon the material breach by the Plaintiff. 
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Notwithstanding, the breach by the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sought the Court to 
force the Defendant to remove four (4) of the nine (9) signs, for which the Defendant 
claims damages. (T-153.) The lower court erred when it granted the orders to 
compel removal of the signs. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at page 157. 
B. The Facts When Marshalled Show That the Trial Court Abused its 
Discretion When it Held the Defendant Did Not Prove Damages Because the 
Facts Show That the Defendant Proved its Damages Without Any Refutation or 
Objection by the Plaintiff. 
Defendant acknowledges that the lower Court entered findings of fact, which 
requires the Defendant to marshall all of the evidence, and then show that the same is 
an abuse of discretion by the lower Court. Note Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087, 
(UtahApp. 1995). 
The lower Court made only one FINDING OF FACT, regarding the issue of 
damages, which Counsel respectfully submits is really a CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
but titled a FINDING OF FACT: 
8. Defendant has failed to prove any damages as a result of Plaintiffs 
failure to timely issue sign permits, for issuing permits with a sign-specific 
sequence for removal, or on account of Plaintiffs failure to publish 
Defendant's "priority" for off premise signs along Interstate 80 because 
such signs are unlawful under Plaintiff s present Zoning Ordinance. 
Assuming that this Court finds this Conclusion of Law to really be a 
FINDING OF FACT, Appellant will now marshall all of the evidence that supports 
the same. This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript at page 1 through 
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and including 57 line 9, as there was "no evidence" submitted during opening 
argument. 
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning on page 57 
to 89 and 100 to 106, as during these parts of the testimony of Terry Christiansen, he 
did not provide any evidence of damages. 
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning on page 
106 to and including page 203, where Defendant Lundgren was called by the 
Plaintiff to testify, and he did not produce any evidence of damages during this part 
of the said transcript. 
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 204 
to and including page 266, however excluding pages 227 and 245 where there is 
evidence of damages. 
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 294 
to and including page 337, then from 339 to 358, then 360 to page 385 where there is 
no evidence submitted by Mr. Lundgren regarding damages. 
This Finding/Conclusion is supported in the Transcript beginning at page 407 
to and including page 418 and then from 420 to 432, as Denver Snuffer offered no 
evidence of damages. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the foregoing is a total and complete 
marshaling of all of the evidence that supports the Findings/Conclusion that the 
Defendant "failed to prove any damages". 
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Appellant submits that the abuse of discretion occurs when one we looks to 
the Transcript at page 90 through 100, where Terry Christiansen, explained that the 
provision of the Stipulation were all material; page 227 where Mayor Johnson 
testified regarding Exhibit 12, and how that established some evidence of value in 
the signs and the same with page 245; page 338 to and including 348, where 
Defendant admitted into evidence Exhibit 36, which showed all of his damages, 
along with an explanation of how he arrived at the same; page 359 where the 
Defendant testified regarding damages in having to get a Court Order to correct the 
provision of Exhibit 12, where the Mayor incorrectly showed that the subject signs 
come down according to his priority rather than the priority picked by the Defendant; 
page 326 where Defendant Lundgren testified how the priority being published 
would be of tremendous value to him even if the off-premise signs were made illegal 
by the zoning change made by the Plaintiffs, coupled with page 329, where the 
Defendant's name would be in the official sign policy and benefit the Defendant in 
all kinds of signs; pages 386 to and including 407 where Defendant Lundgren was 
being cross-examined by Plaintiff regarding is damages and Exhibit 36; page 419 
where Denver Snuffer testified as to the value of being in the published sign policy 
and lastly, pages 433 to and including 443, where the Defendant's expert witness 
testified without any refutation or contradiction that each of the signs were valued at 
$48,000.00 and the value of being in the published sign policy to be $40,000.00 for 
each location. 
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At page 438, expert witness Phillip Card testified to the following without 
any dispute or challenge by the Plaintiff in any way: 
Q. Like you to look at Paragraph 13 for me if you would, please. And 
I'll read it to you in case you can't see it from there. 
"It is agreed and understood between the plaintiff and defendant that 
if the plaintiff city issues sign permits in the future, the defendant by 
virtue of its existing signs, will have apriority over any applicant who 
does not have an existing sign. " 
Could you give us some idea as to how valuable that may or may not be. 
A. Well, it would be very valuable, I would think. 
Q. And is there any possible way you could put a figure on that? 
A. Well, depends on the number, basically, but I would say $40,000.00 
per location. 
Q. For location? 
A. Depending on the viewing of it. 
Q. Yeah. Let me go on. "And the plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps 
are necessary to insure that this priority for existing signs is made a 
part of the published sign policy of plaintiff city". 
Have you ever seen a sign policy where somebody has apriority over 
any person that doesn 't have an existing sign? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you be able to tell us whether or not that would be valuable to 
the Defendant? 
A. Well, yeah. It eliminates the competition. 
Q. Can you put a price on (hat, particularly? 
A. Well, there again, it goes back to the 40 times the monthly billing. If 
it works out that you can rent both sides versus one side, it depends. 
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Defendant was forced to remove four signs valued at $48,000 each; was 
denied the published priority which was valued at 40 times the sign monthly billing, 
and the permits were valued at $40,000 each. The City did not dispute these figures 
or present any opposing testimony, nor did it object to the testimony. In addition Mr. 
Lundgren testified extensively as to his damages, also unrefuted. 
This expert witness was uniquely qualified as an expert witness not just by 
his experience in the sign industry for 33 years and the fact that he had been involved 
in as many as 60 billboards. The one factor that made this witness so credible was 
the fact that he was actually going to buy the signs in question the year before the 
trial, and he had personally made a determination of the price he would pay for the 
subject signs. 
Appellant respectfully submits that it is clearly an abuse of discretion for the 
lower Court to make a Finding/Conclusion that the " Defendant failed to prove any 
damages..." The record overwhelmingly refutes that Finding/Conclusion. 
In this case the Plaintiff was the first to breach the contract, and therefore all 
of the foregoing damages are compensable to the Defendant. Note Breuer-Harrison 
v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990) and Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279 (Utah 
1972). 
// 
// 
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III. ARGUMENT THREE: THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BASIS THAT 
THE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANT WERE WITHOUT 
MERIT AND NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
In this action, the lower Court made and entered FINDINGS OF FACT 11, 
which states: 
11. Plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney 'sfees incurred in the 
enforcement of the Stipulation for the period commencing September 16, 
1989 through the trial of this matter, which was concluded August 15, 1995. 
Plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees is based upon Title 78-27-56 UCA 1953, 
as amended. That section provides, inter alia, that the Court shall aware 
attorney 'sfees to a litigant in the prosecution of a claim if the defense 
asserted by the opposing party is without merit and is asserted in bad faith. 
By these proceedings, the Plaintiff has sought to enforce those provision of 
the Stipulation which required removal of the signs required to be removed 
in 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. The validity and enforceability of the 
Stipulation was determined by the orders made by the Court in 1986 and 
the Defendants Appeal from those orders was dismissed. The evidence in 
the file in this case shows that there has not been a single instance after the 
1986 Order and the dismissal of the Appeal in which the Defendant has 
timely complied with the Stipulation which required removal of signs on 
December 31, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993. Legal action was required in 
each separate instance to enforce removal of the signs order to be removed 
in 1987, 1989, 1993 and the sign to be removed by year end 1991 was not 
removed until August or September 1992. Defendant has participated in 
proceedings throughout as an attorney and/or litigant. The Court finds that 
the claims and defenses asserted by the Defendant as a defense to his 
failure to remove the signs are without merit and are not asserted in good 
faith. The Court further finds that the reasonable amount of attorney 'sfees 
incurred by the Plaintiff in the enforcement of the Stipulation from 
September 6, 1989, through August 16, 1995, exclusive of those fees related 
to securing the Order of Contempt as referred to in Paragraph 10 of these 
Findings, is $16,843.00. 
According to Allred v. Brown. 893 P.2d 1087 (Utah App. 1995), Appellant is 
required to marshall all of the evidence in support of the subject FINDING, and then 
show how the same is an abuse of discretion. 
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In meeting this obligation, Appellant carefully reviewed the Transcript from 
page 1 to 1666, and the record from 00001 to and including 1099, and no where in all 
of these pages is there evidence that the Defendant at anytime claimed a defense that 
was without merit or any defense that was not maintained in good faith. 
Appellant submits that what is in fact called a FINDING OF FACT, is really 
more a CONCLUSION OF LAW, as this Court is not given any facts or detail of 
evidence that the lower Court observed at trial, rather all this Court is given in the 
alleged FINDING OF FACT, is a conclusion that the Defendant has claimed all 
along that Plaintiff has materially breached and therefore the Defendant need not 
have to further comply with the Stipulation, and that claim/defense is without merit 
and not asserted in good faith. 
Defendant claims that once the Plaintiff City failed to purchase the sign they 
agreed to in 1983, he then was excused from any further requirements of the 
Stipulation. 
According to Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), the issue of 
"without merit" is a question of law, and reviewed for correctness, whereas the "bad 
faith" is a question of fact reviewed on the basis of an abuse of discretion. Baldwin 
v. Burton. 850 P.2d at 1199. Note Topik v. Thurber. 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987) and 
also Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
According to Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) to meet the 
"without merit" prong, Plaintiff would have had to show that the defenses of the 
Defendant, were "frivolous" and "of little weight or importance having no basis in 
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law or fact". To meet the "lack of good faith" prong, the Plaintiff would have had to 
show that the defense of the Defendant was not based on: 
"(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no 
intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, (sic) hinder, delay 
or defraud others ". Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d at 151. 
In Cady this Court drives home a critical point of law and logic, and this is 
before one looks at the application of 78-27-56, one must be the prevailing party. 
Here, the lower Court held in favor of the Defendant on the basis that the 
Plaintiff had breached the contract and agreement of the parties as reflected in the 
Stipulation. As a matter of law and as a matter of logic, Appellant respectfully 
submits, that the Court can not on the one hand say that the claim is without merit 
and not asserted in good faith; and then on the other hand grant judgment on the 
claim. Defendant was a prevailing party on the claim of breach by failure to 
purchase. The Plaintiff was excused for its other failures to perform, but cannot be 
construed as a prevailing party. It is totally illogical that Plaintiff should be granted 
attorney fees for Defendant's unmeritorious defense, when the Defendant prevailed. 
Even if Defendant did not prevail, as in the case of Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), this Court stated: 
A party may bring a good faith action and not prevail. Failure of the cause 
of action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to pay 
costs. If we were to adopt such an approach, parties who had difficult but 
valid claims would be economically precluded from bringing suit. Watkiss 
& Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d at 1067-1068. 
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Even if this Court were to agree with the lower Court that the defenses of the 
Defendant were without merit and not asserted in good faith, this Court would still 
have to reverse the lower Court on inadequate findings. Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 
202 (Utah App. 1991). 
Appellant respectfully submits that he prevailed on his defense, but even if he 
had not it was clearly maintained in good faith and had merit; therefore, this Court 
should reverse the award of attorney's fees ordered by the lower Court. 
If any party is guilty of maintaining an action which is subjects the other 
party to attorney fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 (UCA 1953), it is the actions of 
the Plaintiff. The Defendant requested such damages, but they were not granted by 
the trial court. This Court should rectify that error and also grant the Defendant its 
attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The most compelling fact, that the Appellants feel is dispositive in this action, is 
not even in dispute. Arguments One, Two and Three all hinge on this one fact, and if this 
one fact is true, then the Court could appropriately reverse on each of the three arguments. 
That fact is that Coalville City materially breached the contract and agreement in reference 
to Paragraph 1, in the Stipulation. If that one fact is true, and it is not disputed on appeal 
by the Plaintiff Coalville City, then Appellants Argument One is well taken, and he is 
entitled to rescission and reversal of the attorney fees award to the Plaintiff. 
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The case law is clear that the non-breaching party need do nothing further, once the 
breaching party has materially breached the contract and agreement. Hence, no signs 
should have come down, no attorneys fees should have been awarded to the Plaintiff. 
Cross Appellant does not even attempt to challenge the fact that Plaintiff Coalville 
City was the first to breach the contract. Coalville City does not challenge their own 
official minutes which state that they had passed a resolution to buy the sign contemplated 
in the Stipulation, and then failed to make the purchase. 
Furthermore, Coalville City does not challenge the testimony of Terry Christiansen, 
who testified that Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff either lease or purchase, and that it 
was material to the Defendant, and that the City never at any time perform as they had 
agreed. 
Furthermore, Coalville City does not challenge the testimony of Mayor Johnson, 
who testified that Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff City, either buy or lease, and the 
City passed on official resolution to purchase a sign, and that the City never at anytime 
performed as they agreed. 
Every other witness, other than Phillip Card, who was the Defendant's expert 
witness on damages, testified that it was material to the Defendant; that the Defendant 
insisted that the purchase clause be in the agreement, and that the Plaintiff City never at 
anytime performed as they had agreed. 
Hence, the reason that Cross Appellant Coalville City, does not even attempt to 
appeal the determination by the lower Court that they had materially breached the 
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Stipulation between the parties, in failing to purchase the sign as they had agreed, is that 
there is no evidence to the contrary. 
Appellant respectfully submits that once this determination was made by the lower 
Court, then everything else that he asks this Court to do naturally flows from therefrom. 
The other material breaches by the Plaintiff only support and confirm that the Defendant is 
entitled to recission and damages. 
Appellant asks for rescission and rescission is appropriate. The value of having 
Coalville City purchase the sign from the Defendant meant much more to him than merely 
the money involved. That which was so meaningful and valuable to the Defendant was the 
public use and therefore the official endorsement by the City of his signs. That would be 
good not only for public relations and future business, but it creates an endorsement of 
having billboards in the area. This 'foot in the door' for the Defendant was particularly 
further enhanced by the granting of the official priority and the publication in the official 
sign policy. 
Plaintiff encouraged the lower Court to narrowly look at these intentional breaches, 
stating if the Defendant is not out anything since the billboards are no longer allowed. The 
obvious problem with this analysis is that it completely overlooks the benefits to the 
Defendants for signs other than billboards, as he testified to on pages 326 and 329. Such 
value, going on into perpetuity, was astronomical. It also overlooks the incredible value of 
the publicity and prestige of having Defendant's name listed as a priority for the granting 
of permits in an official policy of the City. 
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Once the Plaintiff Coalville City breached the Defendant was no longer required to 
perform and was entitled to rescission. He is also entitled to be restored to where he was 
before the contract and agreement was breached, hence Argument Two, compensatory 
damages where straight rescission is insufficient to restore the Defendant to his pre-
Stipulation position. 
The Finding/Conclusion stating "Defendant has failed to prove any damages. . ." is 
not supported at all in the record. It is critical for this Court to note that the 
Finding/Conclusion does not say this evidence is insufficient or for whatever reason the 
evidence was not acceptable, rather the Finding/Conclusion states that there was none, and 
as this Court can see from the transcript, there was not only substantial evidence regarding 
damages, but the testimony regarding damages was not contradicted or refuted in anyway. 
Mr. Lundgren even sustained damages in correcting Exhibit 12, the bogus permits, 
to establish that the signs would be allowed to stay under Defendant's own pattern of 
removal, not what was expressly put on the permit by the Mayor. This cost the Defendant 
attorneys fees, critical down time in being able to sell and/or market his signs. 
Furthermore, the defective permits caused significant problems with the Defendant's 
security in the Stipulation, since the language in paragraph 10 required that the signs come 
down for which he did not have a permit. Hence, the Defendant sustained significant 
damages in just getting this problem removed, years after it was to have happened in the 
first place, i.e.: 1983 to approximately 1989. 
The Zoning Administrator was to issue sign permits, the Mayor did not have that 
authority. Ironically, Mayor Johnson was the Mayor at the time of the lawsuit was filed, 
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and he was the one that insisted the signs come down, because the Defendant did not have 
valid permits according to the zoning ordinance. Yet this exact same Mayor testified that 
he waited specifically until the new zoning ordinance went into effect before he issued the 
sign permits. His intentionally delay, made his own actions unlawful, as any "delegated 
representative" could issue permission before the new ordinance, however, only the Zoning 
Administrator could issue permits afterwards. Indeed, the new zoning ordinance would not 
allow the permits to be validly issued since it prohibited off-premises signs, the very type 
of signs for which the Mayor issued permits. When the Mayor got around to issuing the 
permits, not only was he not authorized, the ordinance prohibited the issuance of the 
permits, making them void ab initio. 
Perhaps the most troubling part of the lower Court's ruling is that since the zoning 
ordinance prohibits billboards, the Defendant is not entitled to the published preference, his 
'quid pro quo.' The patent unfairness of the Plaintiffs action, is that the Plaintiff City 
created the basis for their nonperformance. They themselves, passed the ordinance that did 
away with the quid pro quo for the Defendant. This selfserving act is manifest bad faith. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower Court on the issue 
of rescission, remand with instructions to award damages to the Defendant to make him 
whole, based on the evidence already adduced by the parties, and completely reverse the 
lower Court on the granting of attorneys fees to the Plaintiff. The Appellant further request 
that this Court instruct the lower court to find that the Plaintiff acted in bad faith and that 
the Plaintiff should reimburse the Defendant for his attorney fees. 
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Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 1996 
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IS THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COALVILLE CITY, } 
Plaintiff, 'J 
vs. ) 
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, dba : 
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, ) 
et al., ; 
Defendants. ) 
• FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 82-039-6856 
> Judge Frank Noel 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honor-
able Frank G. Noel on August 15, 1995 commencing at 8:30 o'clock 
a.m. The Plaintiff, Coalville City was represented by its 
attorneys, Grant Macfarlane, James L. Barker and Kira E. Macfar-
lane. The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney, John 
Walsh. 
The Court has heretofore directed that all pending peti-
tions , motions, orders to show cause and other pleadings and 
unresolved issues in this matter be heard by the Court in an 
evidentiary hearing and that such matters be adjudicated by the 
Court and disposed of by a Decree to be entered in this cause. 
The unresolved claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are 
set forth in Plaintiff's Verified Petition, dated February 19, 
1990; in Plaintiff's Motion dated March 29, 1990 based upon the 
Verified Petition of February 19, 1990 and in Plaintiff's Veri-
fied Petition dated August 29, 1994. The claims asserted by the 
nnnaan 
Defendant are set forth in Iris Verified Petition dated August 29, 
1994 and in various other motions, pleadings and memoranda 
heretofore filed by the Defendant in this cause. 
The matter was tried to the Court on August 15 and 16. Each 
of the parties adduced evidence in support of their various 
claims and in defense of claims asserted by the other. Upon con-
clusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing the pending 
matters were argued to the Court by counsel for the respective 
parties and thereupon submitted to the Court for decision. The 
Court being fully advised in the premises now makes the follow-
ing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. ALVIN-R. LUNDGREN, (hereinafter referred to as "Defend-
ant")
 r wasthe sole shareholder and managing officer of ALL 
ASSOCIATES, INC., the original defendant in this cause. All 
Associates, Inc. was dissolved in 1986 and its assets were trans-
ferred to the Defendant including the advertising signs herein-
after referred to. The Defendant has heretofore entered his 
personal appearance and has been substituted as the Defendant in 
this cause. 
2. Under date of March 23, 1983 the parties entered into a 
Stipulation (herein referred to as "the Stipulation") compromis-
ing and settling the issues raised by the pleadings heretofore 
filed by the parties. The Stipulation was submitted to and 
approved by the Court by Order dated April 5, 1983. 
3. At the time the Stipulation was entered into, Defendant 
had constructed and was maintaining nine (9) billboard advertis-
ing signs along Interstate Highway 80 within the Coalville City 
limits. The Stipulation required Plaintiff to issue a permit for 
each of the Defendant's nine signs, provided that one of each of 
such permits should expire on December 31, 1985, 1987, 1989, 
1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997, and that two of such permits should 
expire December 31, 2001. 
4. The Stipulation required the Defendant to remove one 
sign of his choosing each time a permit expired. Sign permits 
"
2
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Mere issued by the City prior to fihe removal of the first sign 
removed by the Defendant. While the permits on their face show 
that the Defendant was required to remove his signs in a certain 
sequence, the facts, including Orders entered by the Court, show 
that the Defendant was and is entitled to and has selected the 
sequence in which each sign was removed. 
5. The sign permits issued to the Defendant as provided for 
and interpreted by orders of the Court herein create valid and 
enforceable rights and obligations as contemplated by the Stipu-
lation. Plaintiff has never challenged the validity of the 
permits and Defendant has presented no evidence which 'THOWI 
the permits are 'invalid or unenf orceab I e,, 
6 The Stipulation (Paragraph 13) requires the Plaintiff to 
'grant to the Defendant a priority in the event permits for 
certain' signs were issued by the Plaintiff after the Stipulation 
was entered into. Plaintiff was further required to publish this 
priority in the "Published Sign Policy" of the Plaintiff City. 
Plaintiff contends that the priority referred to :i m the Stipuia-
tiion pertained only to "off-premises" signs which might there-
after be located along Interstate 80 within the Coalville City 
limits. Defendant contends that the priority pertained to r]\ 
sign permits issued by the City after the date of the Stipu-
lation, whether on ox off premises signs, and regardless of where 
located within the Ci try limi ts. "Off-premises signs" are adver-
tising signs which ar e not located on th e business premises of 
the advertiser. Converse] y, "on-premises" signs axe signs 
located on the business premises of the advertiser. The Court 
heard evidence from the parties and from the attorneys who 
assisted in the negotiation and preparation of the Stipulation. 
From the language of the Stipulation and the testimony of the 
various witnesses
 4the Court finds that 1 t wa s intended by the 
parties and by the Stipuiati on that the priority referred to in 
Paragraph 13 of ^ the Agreement pertain only t:< i off-premises signs 
which,may-be located along Interstate 80 within the Coalville 
City l i m i t s f r o m and after the date of the Stipulation. 
I^da5fe^*^*l»tif f has not issued any sign permits for the 
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construction of off-premises signs on Interstate 80 since the 
date of the Stipulation. The Plaintiff did not publish the 
Defendant's priority for off-premises advertising signs along 
Interstate 80. Since the date of the Stipulation, Plaintiff has 
passed an Ordinance making it: illegal to construct off-premises 
signs . Nothing in the Stipulation prevented the City from 
adopting such an Ordinance. 
8. Defendant has failed to prove any damages as a result of 
Plaintiff's failure to timely issue sign permits* for issuing: 
permits with a sign-specific sequence for* removal, or on account 
of Plaintiff's failure to publish Defendant's "priority" in a 
published Sign Policy. No useful purpose would be served by 
requiring Plaintiff ta_publish Defendant-'s-priority—for- o££-
premises signs along Interstate 80 because such signs are unlaw-
ful under Plaintiff's present Zoning Ordinance. 
9. Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation requires Plaintiff to 
purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant at the Defendant's 
cost, not to exceed $5,200 in the event of a purchase. No time 
for performance of this obligation was set forth in the Stipula-
tion. No request or demand for the purchase or lease of a sign 
was made by Defendant for several years after the Stipulation was 
entered into. Rather, Defendant took the position that the 
Stipulation was unenforceable and has maintained that position 
right up to and during the trial of this case. Plaintiff takes 
the position that the purchase of a sign by the Coalville City 
Chamber of Commerce satisfied the purpose and intent of Paragraph 
1 of the Stipulation which required Coalville City to lease or 
purchase a sign from the Defendant. The Court finds from the 
evidence that thePlaintiff is in default in its obligation to 
purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant. The Defendant did 
not furnish an itemization of costs required by Paragraph 1 of 
the Stipulation within 60 days after signing of the Stipulation. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Defendant has sustained 
damages in the amount of $3,890 on account of the default of 
Plaintiff in failing to purchase the sign. Interest shall accrue 
on the.damage award from January 1, 1985 to present at 10Z per 
annum. 
-.
 ±at±£f h a s filed a Verified Petition in this cause 
alleging that the Defendant is in contempt of Court for wi llful 
disobedience of an Order of the Court issued in these proceedings 
under date of September 6, 1989 By that Order, the Court 
specifically directed "that the sign bearing advertising for 
Coalville City shall n~_ ae removed as one of the signs referred 
to- herein or in "the Jurigjiwrnt" The Coux t heard evidence in 
support of and in opposition to the Plaintiff's 'Petition for a 
judgment of contempt. The Coxir't finds from, 'the evidence that.- in 
December of 1989 the Defendant personally removed the sign 
bearing advert is i ng for Coalville City; that at the time of the 
removal of ^ p sign the Defendant had knowledge of the Court's 
Order; that tinder stood th e Order.;-, that h e knew that removal of 
t j i e s£g„n w a a a VjLoiation of the Order and, therefore, that 
Defendant knowingly and willfu 1 1 y v I olated the sai d Order and is 
therefore in contempt of Cour t. In pla ce of any fine or impri-
sonment which the Court might impose for the contempt, the Court 
has determined that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff the costs and fees incurred by Plaintiff in securing 
the Contempt Order. Based upon Affidavits submitted by counsel 
at the direction of the Court, the Court finds that the reason-
able fees incurred by Plaintiff I n securing the Contempt Order 
are in the amount of $3,542. 
] 1 Plaintiff seeks reco vex y of attox ne^ ' ' s fees incur r ei i i ici 
the enforcement of the Stipulation for the period commencing 
September 6, 1939, through the trial of this matter which was 
concluded August 16, 1995. Plaintiff's c La i m for attorney's fees 
is based upon Title 78-27-56 UCA 1953, as amended. That section 
provides, inter alia, that the Court shall award attorney's fees 
to a litigant in the prosecution of a claim if the defense 
asserted by the opposing party is without merit and is asserted 
in bad faith. By these proceedings, the Plaintiff has sought to 
enforce those prov i si OILS of the Stipulation which required 
removal of the signs required to be removed in 1987, 1 9^3 
and 1993,, The validity and enforceability of the Stipulation was 
determined by orders made W the Court In I "iliifi ,ui<i the Defendants 
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Appeal from those orders was dismissed. The evidence in the file 
in this case shows that there has not been a single instance 
after the 1986 Order and the dismissal of the Appeal in which the 
Defendant has timely complied with the Stipulation which required 
removal of signs on December 31, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993. 
Legal action was required in each separate instance to enforce 
removal of the signs ordered to be removed in 1987,. 1989 and 1993 
and the sign to be removed by year end 1991 was not removed rmtil 
August or September 1992. Defendant, has participated ixr the 
proceedings throughout as an attorney and/or litigants The Court 
finds that the claims and defenses asserted by the Defendant as a 
defense to his failure to remove the signs are without merit and 
are not asserted in good faith. The Court further finds that the 
reasonable amount of"attorneyhs fees incurred"by Plaintiff in the 
enforcement of the Stipulation from September 6, 1989, through 
August 16, 1995, exclusive of those fees related to securing the 
Order of Contempt as referred to in Paragraph 10 of these Find-
ings, is $/^/%/5'<-
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Stipulation is valid and enforceable. There has 
been no material breach of the Stipulation on the part of Plain-
tiff. Defendant is not entitled to rescind the Stipulation. 
Defaults on the part of the Plaintiff in failing to timely issue 
sign permits; in issuing permits which provided for sign-specific 
sequencing for removal; and in failing to publish Defendant's 
priority for off-premises signs along Interstate 80 are not 
material breaches of the Stipulation in that Defendant has proved 
no damages resulting from any such breach. Plaintiff's default 
in failing to purchase a sign from the Defendant resulted in 
damages in the amount of $3,890 and the default can be remedied 
by the award of damages, and therefore does not go to the consid-
eration for the Stipulation and is not sufficient to justify 
rescission. 
oooaso 
2. Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaint iff 
in the amount f $3,890 on account of Plaintiff's default in the 
purchase of a ' ^ " TTT Defendant. Interest should accrue an 
this award from January " 1 985 at the rate of 101 per annum. 
3* Defendant :i s not entitled to Ltie equitable relief of 
rescission in any event because he does not come before the Court 
with "clean hands" in that he has repeatedly violated the terms 
of the Stipulation and is in contempt of Court for willful 
disobedience of a direct order of the Court in these proceedings. 
4. Defendant is not entitled i< the equitable relief of 
rescission in any event for the reasc that Defendant fai Led to 
give timely notice of rescission and tender ; *-:r^  f considera-
trLoir~received-and-further becaus e it i s imposrs ib i e to res tore the 
parties to the position they were . = ^  . to entering into the 
Stipulation, the Defendant having maintained the advertising 
signs pursuant uu the Stipulation foi a period of approximately 
12 years. 
""i, ihe sign permits issued to the Defendant as provided for 
and interpreted by orders of the Court herein create valid and 
enforceable right uu obligations as contemplated by the Stipu-
lation. 
6 Defendant is in contempt of Cour t for willful disobed-
ience of the Court's Order entered September 6, 1989 and should 
be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the reasonable and necessary fees 
incurred by Plaintiff I n securi ng the Contempt Order which fees 
are in the amount of $3^542. 
7. The Defendant is in default under , terms of the 
Stipulation by his failure 1; u remove the sign required to be 
removed December 31, 1993 and the Court should order .:he Defend-
ant to remove the sign within 60 days from the ^atc of the Decree 
to be entered in this matter. 
8. The priority referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Stipula-
tion relates only to off-premises signs Located along Interstate 
80 within the Coalville City limits. No further order should be 
made with respect to publication of Defendant1^ priority rights 
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for such off-premises signs because the same are illegal under 
the City's present Zoning Ordinance* 
9. Plaintiff should beawarded Judgment against Defendant 
in the amount of $/u7 / fl Mr O for attorney's fees incurred by 
Plaintiff, exclusive of the fees referred to in Paragraph 5 in 
the enforcement of the Stimulation. 
7 18* "Any relief sought ib^elther party *hich is not disposed 
of by the Decree entered pursuant to the foregoing Findings of 
Fact. and~Conc lusions of Law should be denied. 
MADE AHD ENTERED this ^Mr^ Gar o f ^ g A j » 1995-
a j
0t * Igl 
l^\ COUNTY j y 
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GRAHT HACFARLANE, JR. (#2040) 
JJHES L - BARKER (#0205) 
KIRA E. MACFARLANE (#7081) 
A t to rneys f or P l a i n t i f f 
The Reid Bn-f Iriing 
750 E . Kearns B l v d . , S u i t e 212 
P . O^Box 680106 
P a r k J d t j , Utah^S4Q68-Q106 
Telegfeoner (801> 649-2014 
BS^THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT CODNTT 
STATE 01-" UTAH 
COALVILLE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, dba 
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honor-
able Frank G. Noel on August 15, 1995 commencing at 8:30 o'clock 
a.m. The Plaintiff, Coalville City was represented by its 
attorneys, Grant Macfarlane, James L. Barker and Kira E. Macfar-
lane. The Defendant appeared in per;.~r and by his attorney, John 
Walsh. 
The Court has heretofore directed that all pending peti-
tions, motions, orders to show cause and other pleadings and 
unresolved issues in this matter be heard by the Court in an 
evidentiary hearing and that such matters be adjudicated by the 
Court and disposed of by a Decree to be entered in this cause. 
The unresolved claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are 
set forth in Plaintiff's Verified Petition, dated February 19, 
1990; in Plaintiff's Motion dated March 29, 1990 based upon the 
Verified Petition of February 19, 1990 and in Plaintiff's Veri-
fied Petition dated August 29, 1994. The claims asserted by the 
BOOKUUMfiEO'67 
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DECREE 
C i v i l No. 82-039-6856 
Judge Frank Noel 
Defendant are set forth in his Verified "Petition dated itiogsct 29, 
1994 and in various other motions, pleadings and memoranda. 
heretofore filed by the Defendant in this cause. 
The matter was tried to the Court on August 15 and 16, 'Each 
of the parties adduced evidence in support of their various 
claims and in defense of claims asserted by .the other, upon 
elusion of the evidentiary portion of the lw^ arf-ng the pending 
matters were argued to the Court by counsel for the respective* 
parties and thereupon submitted to the Court: £or decision* * _ 
Court being fuiiy advised in the premises and having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Coneiusions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS^ 
1. Defendant is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff in the 
amount of $3,890 on account of Plaintiff's Default in failing to 
purchase a sign from Defendant, Defendant is awarded prejudgment 
interest from January 1, 1985 at the rate of 10Z per annum. 
2. Defendant is Adjudged to be in Contempt of Court for 
willful disobedience of the Court's Order entered September 6, 
1989. In lieu of fine, imprisonment or other sanctions, the 
Court orders that Plaintiff be and it is hereby awarded Judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of $3,542 for Plaintiff's reason-
able and necessary attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
securing the Contempt Order. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against Defendant in the 
amount of $ /ffi/ J^ fj "^for reasonable and necessary attorney's 
fees incurred by Plaintiff in the enforcement of the Stipulation 
and Orders of the Court herein, said amount being in addition to 
the fees awarded by Paragraph 2 of this Decree. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to remove one additional sign 
within sixty (60) days from the date of this Decree representing 
the sign required to be removed December 31, 1993. 
5. It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the "priority" 
referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Stipulation dated March 23, 
1983, and approved by the Court April 5, 1983, relates only to 
wartj-entt o 68 
r\ r\ i~\ d Q 3i 
"off-premises" signs located along Interest HII wxthin the 
Coalville City limits. 
f\ Any relief heretofore sought bv pending pleadings of 
either party which i <3 not disposed of b-" the provisions of thi 
Decree is denied. 7^- *•-, V 
MaDE AHD EHTEKED this JH£/day of ^ ^ X . ____, 1995 
BT THE CODET-
****M 
B00Kl)0MffiO69 
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
DAY, BARNEY & TYCKSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 8 4107 
Telephone! (801) 262-6800 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COALVILLE CITY, : 
Plaintiff, r STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
ALL ASSOCIATES, INC* : 
Defendant. : Civil Number: 6856 
COME NOW the Plaintiff and Defendant in"the above-captione< 
case and, pursuant to the agreement set forth below, stipulate 
dismiss this cause of action with prejudice, and respectfully 
request that the Court enter judgment to that effect, J?he 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, pursuant to whici 
this stipulated dismissal is being taken, is as follows; 
1. With-in thirty (30) days from the date hereof, Defendan 
agrees to provide Plaintiff a written bid for providing a paint 
sign face for Coalville City at Plaintifffs cost, the design of 
which shall be agreed upon between the parties. Within said 
thirty day period, Defendant shall also supply Plaintiff with a 
necessary cost information to enable Plaintiff v.o choose bet i 
leasing or purchas: > -.  subject: sign. When Plaintiff 
determines to either r urchase the sign, Defendant agrees 
to provide a , • .- I i mi days a£ter 
notification by Defendant proceed* Said sign face is to be 
erected at Defendant s 
day period at any one of Defendant's line present sign locations. 
• However, when the current lease agreement expires between 
D e f e n d a i 11, a i i ciiil B 1 31 1 y ' s.. C :: •' : :i i i "I i \ h o i i 
than February, 1984), Defendant agrees to immediately move, at nc 
cost to plaintiff, tac sig- f n ^ constructed fen; IP I , i i n 1" 1 f f' I I! • 
locations currently occupied Billy's Country Music Emporium, 
which location is known Associates sign location number 
c •. " J =!!' If 1 J! c i :i • ,1 :: ::i f f i: • a s = \ r atl ie* : t: ,1: lan lease the sign 
face, Plaintiff will be solely responsible to maintain the sign 
face and will In • i1 i n I i mancial obligation f Defendar J Tl: =! • 
cost of purchase w *, 1 1 not exceed 1^^ ,21)0, M n i - sign 
structure. After the expiration of A 1 1 Associates1 lease with 
t I l I 1 I "! I l l l l II I I " «,i 'in I 1 1 II III I , i I l I II 1 3 
erected# Plaintiff may extend the lease al*. Its cost with .1 
obligation to Defendant for t he continued and indefinite use of 
t I  in I in mi 1: (is • c 11: 1 s:::!: gi 1 fa ::: i-is :i xected . 
: The Plaintiff agrees to 1 ssue • one sign permit 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain f f i d 
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of 1985. 
3 . The P l a i n t i f f agrees to i s sue one sign permit to the 
Defendant permit t ing the Defendant to r e t a i n a sign u n t i l the e 
of 1987. 
4. The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the e 
of 1989. 
5. That P l a i n t i f f agrees to i s sue one s ign permit to the 
Defendant permit tingJIthe^Def end ant -to retain- a sifln unt i l the e 
of 1991. 
6. The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the < 
of 1993. 
7. The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the . 
of 1995. 
8. The Plaintiff agrees to issue one sign permit to the 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain a sign until the 
of 1997. 
9. The Plaintiff agrees to issue two sign permits to the 
Defendant permitting the Defendant to retain two signs until t 
end of 2001. 
10. I t i s agreed and understood between the P la int i f f anc 
the Defendant tha t the Defendant w i l l remove signs for which t 
3 -
Defendant does not have a pe rmi t , on or before the expira t ion of 
the permit period taking in to cons idera t ion the weather condi-
t ions in C o a l v i l l e , Utah. 
11 • I t i s agreed and understood between t he P l a i n t i f f and 
the Defendant tha t p r i o r to the exp i ra t ion of any of the Defen-
d a n t ' s pe rmi t s , t h e Defendant may apply to the P la in t i f f , t o have 
any such permit renewed for a period of time agreed upon between 
the P l a i n t i f f and Defendant* 
12. ~ I t ~ i s agreed~~and~ understood t h a t the Defendant may applj 
the permits granted he re in to the ex i s t ing s ign s t ruc tu re s and 
locat ions ind iv idua l ly as the Defendant deems appropr ia te , and 
tha t the P l a i n t i f f w i l l not con t ro l which permit i s applied to 
which s ign . 
13. I t i s agreed and understood between the P l a i n t i f f and 
Defendant t h a t if the P l a i n t i f f City i s sues s ign permits in the 
future , the Defendant, by v i r t u e of i t s e x i s t i n g s igns , w i l l have 
a p r i o r i t y over any a p p l i c a n t who does not have an ex i s t ing s ign , 
and the P l a i n t i f f agrees to take whatever s t e p s are necessary to 
insure tha t t h i s p r i o r i t y for ex i s t ing s igns i s made a pa r t of 
the published sign po l icy of the P l a i n t i f f C i t y . 
DATED t h i s $*f day of y/Y%^<Zrf 19 8_-3. 
By Mer£yn JdWnson / ' 
- 4 
TERRY L_ \CHRISTXSWSEN, 
Attorney cox- P l a i n t i f f 
G4U 
. ; 
tor / 
—> 
•> 
DATED 
afufejs 
ALL ASSOCIATES^ INC. , DATED 
By A l Lundgren 
JXEMVER C^^SJKJFRJJRy JR. 
Attorney for Defendant; 
Qatw 7-1. Kite 
7 DATED 
O R D E R 
The foregoing S t i p u l a t i o n i s approved by the Court, and the 
above-captioned mat te r i s hereby, dismissed wi th prejudice. 
DATED t h i s ^ i £ ^ a y of J fy / 19 8^ . 
y^ssry 
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AFPLICATIGii FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0- Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
D*cad February 26, 1985 Expires Decemoer 31. 2001 
Alvin EL» Lundgroir All Associates^ Inc-
Address Ig69 Siesta TJrfve 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Sign Placement Address John Hobson Property on past Strip nf T-ftn 
Dimensions 14' x 43' 
Description „ 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Approved By 'rfffii*<&^ /t^*^~#fa^^ Title ^ ^ 5 ^ 7 
Date Paid Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks: 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26, 1985 Expires 12-31-85 
Name 
Address 
Alvln-sr Lundgrotl 
1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
All Associates;"Inc. 
Sign-Placement Address C. B. Copley Property Along- 1-80 
Dimensions I4, x 48' 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Approved By / / V ^ ^ ^ ^ V ^ 
T 
Date Paid ' Receipt No. T)^UU^ 
Remarks \ 
APPLICATION FOE SIGN PEBMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26, 1985 Expires 12-31-97 
Name Alvin R. Lundgron All Associates,Inc. 
Address 1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Sign Placement Address Thomas Copley Walker Property on East Side of 1-80 
Dimensions 14' x 48' 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16,00 
Approved By tf^^dL. .<f£~&*tt^2*<rr ^ Title yJCy^^r «P^ 
Date Paid Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks: 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26. 1985 Expires 12-31-93 
Name Alvin ft> Lundgron All Associates; Ine^ 
Address 1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Sign Placement Address Thomas Copley Walker property on West Side of 1-80 
Dimensions 14' * 48< 
Description __ 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Approved By /sfe*?££U, ^C^&^^Z"0* Title s^&Csr+y 
Date Paid _ Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks: 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26, 1985 Expires 12-31-95 
Name Alvfn R. Lundgron All Associates, Inc. 
Address 1869'Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Sign Placement Address Clarence Keves Property on Wesr Side of T-fiO 
Dimensions 14' x 48' 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Approved . , - ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ C - t i d e ^Z<~+-
Date Paid Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks: 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Paced February 26, 1985 Expires TW„mhOT- 7i m m 
Name 
Address 
Alvin R. Lundgron All Associates. 
1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Inc. 
Sign Placement Address Clarence Keves Property on E^r Sin* «f T-fln 
Dimensions l4' * 48' 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Approved By tie y ^ y ^ ^ r ^ 
Date Paid ~ Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks i 
APPLICATION FOK 2>1W rt*nn 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26, 1985 Expires 12-31-89 
Name Alvin R. Lundgron All Associates, Inc. 
Address 1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Sign Placement Address Clarence Keyes Property on West Side of 1-80 
Dimensions 14* x 48T 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16.00 
Date Paid ./_ Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks! 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Dated February 26, 1985 E x P i r e s 12-31-91 
Name 
Address 
Alvin R. Lundgron 
1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
All Associates, Inc. 
Sign Placement Address John Hobson prnpgrfy nn Fact- R i ^ of T_an 
Dimensions 14> * 48' 
Description 
Cost of Sign Permit Amount $16,00 
Approved By y^ffls^^f^isi^^^*^^^r^^<4k*^l*• t * e 
Date Paid 
^Y 
Receipt No. D5443 
fifarks T 
APPLICATION FOR SIGN PERMIT 
Coalville City 
P. 0. Box 188 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
d February 26. 1985 Expires .Z-Zl-S' 
j Alvin R. Lundgron 
rcss 1869 Siesta Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
All Associates, Inc. 
n Placement Address John F. Hobson Property on West Side of 1-80 
oensions 14' x 48' 
scription 
>st of Sign Permit Amount $16 .00 
PP"ved By yTA^T^C^U, ^ ^ ^ ^ < 7 ^ ^ ? i t le ^ZZg,^? 
ate Paid Receipt No. D5443 
Remarks: 
•Aarcr. >, 'tj 
'lonnv 'tcu-ro :nac te LS u g a m s c Che new I n d u s t r i a l Zoning iiong 
"!v: : c n ; •: • . :-^.."..'i ; an :ea _J -enow If :ne zoning vouia oe vocea ;.n 
•v ^:i" . T.*r>r : ; K . ;nac ~:ie J i t v Counci l w i l l nave a s p e c i a l 
-^^• ; . . : , . . "T : ;r j : ; a u : n e r e j r a ;n iv t n r e e Jounciimemoers .ier = 
_-;. ;n. . -«";..- .•->. ; e s ; :c lave .: * L ^ r e s e n c . 
ViLliam M.. ,'uaa Tiencianea -ha t ne a p p r e c i a t e a t h e s e peop le coming oaz 
zo lee -is new now inev f e e i . He s a i d he c a n ' r see wnv i t c a n ' t be 
zoned to f i t che^r needs . 
A spec i a l , m e e t i n g w i l l be h e l d on Thursday, March 24 , 1983 a t 7:30 p.a. 
At t h i s t i m e , t h e r e w i l l be a short d i s c u * « i o n on the new proposed zoning 
o r d i n a n c e b e f o r e i t i s passed. They are i n v i t e d to a t t end i f they wane 
t o . 
Meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m. 
,'-'. '"'- Recorder 
SPECIAL MEETING HELD 
This meeting is being held in the old court room, Summit County Court 
House, 60 North Main. 
Mayor Merlyu w. Johnson caLled the meeting to order at 7:30 p.m. 
Councilmerabers present were Grant Geary, Russell S. Judd, William M. 
Judd and Colleen R. Sargent with Gerald D. Ball absent due to work 
schedule. Also present were Violet V. Judd, Treasurer; Wendy D. Richias, 
Recorder; Terry Christianson, City Attorney; Stan Strebel and Jerry Saita, 
County Planning Commission; L. Craig Vernon, Robert K. Banz, Dennis Wright,-
Board of Adjustments; Woodrow Nielson, Edwin L. Judd, and Lafe Bowen, Plan-
ning Commission. 
Others in attendance were: 
Name Business (if applicable) 
Boyd E. Willoughby Willoughby Oil Service 
Jim Blonquist 
Phyllis Smith - - - _ - _ ^ _ _ 
Mrs. Richard Aoki 
Frank W. Moore- - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - -
Bob Willoughby Businessman, homeowner, tax 
payer 
Thomas W.. Moore - - - - - - - - - - - . * . - Station Owner 
Marcie Palmer 
Roger Palmer - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ^ « « 
Blair E. Blonquist Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Leon Simister - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ^ « -
George Wallace Wallace Enterprises -
E. Louise Wallace Mobile Home Park 
J. Rose Wallace 
Sharla Banz - - - - - - - - - - - - - . » « _ 
Dwain Clark 
R. R. Toxtnan - - - - - - - - - - - - « « . 
Ed Ercanbrack Station Owner 
Blaine C. Blonquist Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Afton W. Blonquist Blonquist Mink Ranch 
Gertrude Willoughby - - - - - - - - - • - . 
Helen Blonquist Coalville Shopping Center 
Valley View Mobile Park 
R. Lynn Clark - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Reed Warner 
l4ff l 
:n 24. 1983 <cont 
:iai Meeting 
3r Merlyn W. Johnson welcomed m e citizens :o :r,e r.<*e:.;-.« . ..-. .^ :: _ 
cold, them that we are interested in their input. lie .icr.c-.vnsa 
t there are some items that neeti to be taKen care of :cm^n: jucn 
passing two sewer ordinances. There will be a bid ooeninq :ar cne 
project on the sewer plant on Thursday, April 28, L983. Please 
e: Since this meeting, the bid opening has been cancelled.; 
: Mayor mentioned the REGULATION OF SEWER USE Ordinance No. 1983-1 
.ch is AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE USE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SEWERS 
> DRAINS, PRIVATE WASTEWATER DISPOSAL, THE INSTALLATION AND CON-
XION OF BUILDING SEWERS, AND THE DISCHARGE OF WATERS AND WASTES 
CO THE PUBLIC SEWER SYSTEM AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS 
ZREOF IN THE CITY OF COALVILLE, COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH, 
this particular Ordinance, Article III, Section 3 needs to be 
lied in. The Mayor read this item. William M. Judd made a raocion 
at we put in 48 hours in Article III, Section 3, Ordinance No. 1983-1. 
sseli S. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
e Mayor asked all the Councilmembers if they had a chance to go 
trough the two sewer ordinances? There was a positive response, 
issell S. Judd made a motion that we adopt Ordinance No. 1983-1 
i the REGULATION OF SEWER USE. Colleen R. Sargent seconded the 
Jtion. All ayes. The Mayor dated and signed the Ordinance as of 
3d ay. This Ordinance takes affect immediately upon publication. 
he Mayor mentioned that Ordinance No. 1983-2 is AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISH-
NG THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING EQUITABLE SEWER SERVICE CHARGES TO BE 
EVTED ON ALL USERS WHICH DISCHARGE WASTEWATER TO THE WASTEWATER SYSTEM 
DERATED BY THE CITY OF COALVILLE AND PROVIDING CERTAIN PROHIBITIONS. 
le mentioned that in this Ordinance that all residents will be charged 
>12.50 a month for sewer and other sewer users will be charged accord-
ingly. Russell S. Judd made a motion to approve Ordinance No. 1983-2 
MI the sewer charge. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
Che Mayor dated and signed this Ordinance as of today. This Ordinance 
will also take affect upon publication. The Mayor asked the Recorder 
to send a copy of each ordinance to Wayne Thomas with the Utah State 
Department of Health in Salt Lake City. 
The Mayor brought up the Ad in LA basketball tournament programs. Grant 
Geary made a motion to approve the bill for $45.00 seconded by Colleen 
R. Sargent. All ayes. 
The Mayor handed out the extra copies of the proposed zoning ordinance, 
but asked that they be returned at the end of the meeting. The citizens 
are mostly concerned with 2.3 E page 2-1, Amendment Application and Pro-
cedures • 
Leon Simister spoke on behalf of the businessmen and they are wondering 
if the Council could delay their vote for 60 days to give them time to 
discuss the problems that are.a concern. They could then come back with 
a list of the questions to be discussed. 
The Mayor said that the ordinances have been made available for the public 
for some time and the public hearing was advertised and held. We are in 
need of a new zoning ordinance. Our City attorney says we need protection 
of a new zoning ordinance. 
Leon Simister said he has talked to three attorney's and they are puz-
zled that the proposed zoning has changed the general commercial from 
30 blocks to 3. He feels not enough people had knowledge of the new 
change in zoning. 
Terry Christianson, City Attorney told Leon Simister that the publication 
of the zoning hearing was required to be published one time 15 days before 
the hearing. The City had it published twice with an added article in The 
Summit Councy Bee put in by the Mayor. 
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Snec Lai. Meat : ;v:* 
Terry Christiansen, -Jltv Attorney reaa from .0-4-5 m "he 'J tan Jode .iSZ. 
He stated chat if there is a material cnange, the :itv Council nas c -2-
submit the ziuinaes to the Planning Commission for its consideration. 7".:* 
lomnuss; jn thcr? -a turns :he mf oraat ion to the Council vithm 7 0 ;,r.-s. 
Another <:: : :-j.ir: r.z r.us; :e ae;d tivme it least .1 lavs lotL-je. 
me~ Jl.T.i-t :r .jp.cerr.ea that the iouncuaan wno .3 the .miser. :-L-
meen -.n« 7mr.r. ma lommissun ana the iitv Council was hot it the 
rearing ma ne _sn t aere again tonignt. He feels ae snouid be hers. 
leon was to id mat ae is aosent due to his work scneauie. Leon menti-r.-
ea that the two committees shouid have oeen at the hearing to answer 
their questions. Leon asked if they could maxe a written request of the 
things they would like gone over. Russell S. Judd asked Leon why. he 
wanted the zoning delayed for 60 days? Leon said that mavoe it couia :>e 
done in 30 days. 
Russell S. Judd said he has gone through the zoning and he.would like 
to propose some changes. 
Craig Vernon wanted to know where the input was when they were working 
on the zoning during the last year? Leon Simister asked if the meetings 
were advertised when the Planning Commission met? He never knew when 
they were meeting, 
William M. Judd read from 2.3 IT page 2-1, Amendment Application and Pro-
cedures. In the Conditional Use section 6.3 Public Hearing page 6-1 the 
citizens feel that notifing the property owners within 1,000 feet of the 
proposed conditional use is too much of an area. Coalville City isn't 
very large. The City Council will let the Planning Commission.make a 
recommendation on 6.2 and 6.3 page 6-1. Terry Christiansen feels that 
narrowing down the feet might be a mistake, and Leon Simister feels 
that the more people that are involved, the bigger the problem. 
R. Lynn Clark said that the biggest concern he can see is the way the 
map was zoned. General Commercial is not very big. Alot of people 
bought their Land under the old General Commercial zoning and now that 
some of this land is proposed to be Commercial Overlay, the market value 
has dropped. Leon Simister said there is a world of difference between 
the Commercial Overlay and the General Commercial. 
The Mayor mentioned that the new zoning is not going to make every body 
happy. The zoning can be modified as new changes come up. 
Russell S. Judd read from page 11-6, items (3) area and width requiremenci 
and (4) front yard requirements in the Commercial Overlay Zone. The Plan-
ning Commission will be given this to work out. 
Russell S. Judd mentioned that some of the people in town are concerned 
about animals in a Residential Zone. This is mentioned on item 4, page 
11-3. He is referring to Afton Blonquist wanting to expand her mink 
business in the future. Russell S. Judd would like to propose that they 
could be allowed to increase as long as there is adequate acreage. The 
acreage would have to be spelled out so there was no question. 
Stan Strebel recommended that it be added under Section 5 which is 
"Supplementary and Qualifying Regulations" to be headed as Commercial 
Agricultural Expansion of Non Conforming. 
Terry Christiansen, City Attorney mentioned in the Commercial Overlay 
on page 11-6 that public buildings anc facilities should be under a 
Conditional Use not a Permitted Use. He didn't notice this before. 
Leon Simister recommended that the proposed Commercial Overlay be left 
at General Commercial like it was or add to the Commercial Overlay the 
authorized uses as in the General Commercial such as retail, wholesale 
and service establishments as permitted in item 8 page 11-5. 
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Special Meeting 
George and Louise Wallace are upset with the proposed Comraarcial 
Overlay because if they decide to sell their trailer park, the 
market value will be cut because of the new proposed zoning. They 
bought it as General Commercial and if they sell, they want to sell 
it as General Commercial, not Commercial Overlay. 
It was mentioned that Coalville City Is trying to keep the oil veil 
business and its people out of Coalville. Russell S. Judd wanted to 
set the record straight that Coalville City is not trying to keep the 
oil businesses out of the City. They have provided employment for 
alot of the towns people. 
Dennis Wright said that it is the landowners that control the City 
from growing. There are about six or seven people that will not 
sell any of their land. 
Leon Simister said that the restricted area of General Commercial 
will not let much development come in. We are very limited on Main 
Street. 
The Mayor recommended that the City Council put it back in the laps 
of the Planning Commission. They should advertise so the meetings 
can be attended by the the people if they so desire. In 30 days 
we should have it back so the Council can plan for another public 
hearing. 
The Mayor mentioned that the businessmen should get together and 
form a Chamber of Commerce. We need someone to represent Coalville 
City at the meetings we are invited to attend. 
Leon Simister thanked the Planning Commission for their time in 
working on the proposed zoning ordinances and for answering their 
questions tonight. 
Russell S. Judd mentioned that Buster Keyes would like the zoning 
on his property changed to Agricultural because he felt that best 
suited him for his ranching operation. 
Stan Strebel suggested that the businessmen as well as any residents 
make application in writting of the changes they would like to see in 
the new proposed zoning ordinances. They should have this done by 
Monday, April 11, 1983. They can be sent to City Hall and then given 
to the Planning Commission. The Mayor will put an article in the paper 
concerning this. By Monday, April 25, 1983, the revised ordinances 
should be given to the City Council. An advertisement will be pub-
lished on Friday, May 6, 1983 for a public hearing to be held on Mon-
day, May 23, 1983. William M. Judd made a motion that we refer any 
changes back to the Planning Commission and to follow through with 
the date schedules as outlined for the ordinance work. Russell S. 
Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
The citizens left at this time. 
\A0 
March 24, 1983 (cont) 
Special Meeting 
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned that he wrote a letter to Crandall 
Ford-Mercury dated March 10, 1983 concerning the $88.00 invoice no. 10742 
dated January 26, 1983. A reply written the next day was read by the 
Mayor. The invoice was itemized so the Council could see where the money 
was used. In addition, five quarts of oil and an oil filter were used and 
omitted from the invoice. William M. Judd made a motion to pay the $88.00 
invoice in full. Grant Geary seconded the motion. All ayes but Russell 
S. Judd who opposed. 
The Mayor mentioned that Utah Power & Light needs a Minute entry for 
electricity to be run to the new water storage tank at 600 South 200 
East. He also needs authorization to sign a sales tax exemption cer-
tificate on the water tank and an electric Service Agreement for both 
the water tank and the new sewer plant. Russell S. Judd made a motion 
to enter into the agreements with Utah Power & Light on the water tank 
and new sewer system. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes. 
Terry Christiansen, City Attorney, mentioned that he will not give any 
legal opinions to people who come in on City business. The Mayor or 
City Council will have to do this for the people if they deem it necessary. 
The reason for. this was the treatment he and his staff received when con-
tacted by an aggrevated citizen demanding the tapes from the Planning 
Commission meetings. 
R. Lynn Clark mentioned that he needs 1,000 rounds of ammunition for 
practice to maintain his position of being a certified officer. The 
Council approved. 
R. Lynn Clark showed three building permits for approval. Afton Blon-
quist would like to build a 25' x 200' mink shed. There are now 11 sheds 
on 3.5 acres. William M. Judd made a motion to approve the permit, se-
conded by Grant Geary. All ayes. 
Stan Strebel has a building permit for a double garage. Arnie Bosworth 
would also like to put in a double garage. Grant Geary made a motion to 
to accept both permits, seconded by William M. Judd. All ayes. 
The Mayor mentioned that he will be tied up for the next ten Mondays be-
ginning April 4, 1983. He has a class he has to attend. A Mayor Pro-Tea 
will be appointed to take over for him at any meetings. 
The Mayor mentioned the right-of-ways needed from Dave and Ren Wilde to 
get to the water storage tank. Dave has agreed on one water and sewer 
hookup and $1,500.00 in cash. He has requested a receipt for the hook-
ups. 
Ren Wilde could possibly settle for around $4,200.00. We can make ap-
plication to HUD to help on this. We will need a 66' street between 
Ren and Dave. This .8 of an acre will run around $15,000.00. A chain-
link fence will be puL up on the South side of the street. 
Meeting adjourned at 10.30 p.m. 
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General Sign Provision* 
, , (a) Permit*: Jt shall be un-
lawfuTlor a o j person to erect or 
cuiistiuetamy asm, sign post, sign 
boaxd,*psaa 4g mfifca^  awning, per* 
raanent sdvertisffBieBcU accch, tor 
any iiclas aUucUire above, orsrrin 
or around any part of airy 
or afrdesssJk, i n jtoe OUy« 
^* fd ^Axtasaiog perndsston ao in 
do Irecn t t e Ctty^CoimcU or its 
delegated itpiestLntativeiL 
Application for such permission 
shall be in writing and shall con-
tain the name of the person tor 
whose benefit the same is made, 
the period of time for which such 
permit is so desired, the place 
where such structure is to be 
erected or constructed, toe dtz&en* 
sions thereof, the material of 
which the same is to be oompeeed, 
*«*' the farmer of 
shall bt i 
blue sprint 
J of 
posed s i a » ; W other structure* 
Each sign, shall lie installed in ac-
cordance with' the requirements 
of t*K^r*NMh(. Inspector and 
Building t^de; and meet the re-
quired specifieatiaav as to mater-
ia l and 
J » - a a y aoae- M s p e a M C l O o a d -
^ . ^ h a b * ^ a S S > * -
acaaaavai any wj|sr«iBiBl^ aHB:~awr-
mat the rays o£igseJ*s4s*«sjfrfc.*> 
beyotkttbaj 
Is located in a 
constitute a ran wince, - ^ 
(c) Sign on Public Property: 
No .ground sign shall be greeted 
on public owned lands, 'inside 
street right-of-way or otherwise, 
except, signs owned and erected 
by a^ public agency or erected by 
^permission of a?e authorize^ pub* 
-lie agency. " ^ 
tU
 (d) Mohibited Signs: Ko*sign, 
handbill, poster, advertisement or 
notice of any kind or sort, 
whether political or otherwise, 
shall be fastened,, placed, posted, 
/painted or attached in any way 
in or upon any curbstone, lamp 
poet, telephone post, telegraph 
ipole, electrical light or power pole, 
-iiydrant, bridge, tree, rock, side-
walk or street, except signs owned 
and erected by a public agency or 
erected by permission of an-auth-
orized public agency or required 
by law 
^ " (e)" Signs Not to Constitute 
Traffic Hazard* No sign or other 
advertising structure as regulated 
by this Chapter shall be erected 
at the intersection of any streets 
m such a manner as to -obstruct 
free and clear vision, or at any 
location where by reason of the 
position, shape or color, it may 
interfere with, obstruct the view 
of, or be confused with any auth-
orized **!&*?*• sign,, signal or de-
vice or aujneh makes use of the 
word y R r T>rrfein," ••Danger" 
or any o t h e r words, phrases, 
symbol or character m such man-
ner a^s to interfere with, Tntrtffwf 
or confuse traffic * *f 
(f) Maintenance Every" sign 
ahaIT1>e kept in good condition as 
to maintenance and repair The 
ground space within a radius of 
ten feet from the base of any 
ground sign shall be fcent free 
and clear of all *eeds, rubbis£Ttnd 
Inflammable maxerial The Band-
ing Inspector may require 
>dated or ansafe ajgns to bePwTm 
good condition, and upon 
of the owner,to do so 
may 
In 
TvJ»ftsi"naC6a to 
a n^innntun 
teet between 
walk and any 
sign or ground;} 
Into any : 
the exception ~ 
public necessity^ 
signs and name 
signs governed by? 
ing allowed in *one<3 
0 0 
Identification signs A 
lones 
d)t One or two^ 
efcoeeAf onr, square^ 
area unlighted, to I 
plates, bulletin boards t 
pertaining to the 
lease or rental of the ( 
which they are located, < 
ted by this Chapter, 
permitted in any -requinad"' 
side or rear yard. Signs 
taimng to the sale of farm 
ducts raised or produced *m 
premises shall also be permlttedT 
in any required front or rear yard 
provided they are located. notf 
nearer than ten feet to any lot" 
(2) Bulletin boards allowed4h~ 
all sones. A bulletin board not ex-
ceeding eight square feet in area 
erected upon the premises of a 
church or other non-commercial 
institution for the purpose of dis-
playing the name and activities 
of services therein may be aHow-
od in the front or rear yard pro-
Tided they are located not near* 
er than ten feet to any aide lot 
Une.
 r . -^ 
0) Signs in zone R-l, aone 
RA-1, Identification signs. One or 
two signs not to exceed Sour 
square feet m total area attached 
to the building and «mflghted. 
Home occupation -atgns f^aaH be 
hunted to two nnhghted^gna,Jiot 
larger in area than four aquare 
feet in total-area iifirjanaia^than 
-two feet in any one jdiffafltioii and 
placed inside tto* y lattdfcng; any 
aign which is iignte^^jflther dir-
ectly or indirectly fey juttached or 
"oetached lights ^ abaD^ not con-
term nor be aBowaa^ 
(J> S igns^a^afna^^l , aone 
fto building. 
^displayed shall 
u ssse conduriad 
or lot Sf 
to the 
sale -of the property, such 
shall be attached flat against a 
wall of the buHding or the enclos-
ed wall, fence or neoge and par-
allel to its horxaontai dimension-
Fiat sign area lor the front of 
the building shall be two square 
feet for each one foot °f frontage 
with inaximuxn of one hundred 
square feat and a Tniilinmu of 
one hundred square feet of sign 
inquired 
signs 
on 
thar***** 
not 
leeFffiifrbr 
lUin^aV**' 
withfaFthe 
Oc) Signs, in 
i guliittetis tte< 
nea*e^«ban4f< 
!S*r<ijle*tj*-" 
provided it does 
(than ten 
front * yaxop 
may be one dflCTfrfrlttanore than 
three having aK*eeei « e a of 
seventy-two '•qxawr4»et. Ko sign 
shalm&e ptfrntad'tfr jfcreeted on or 
arotthti tlte-JbuIlallgj^other than 
naiofetvef fr\uifl*es^n<fr direction 
sign .^ 31infcer?*y|*«gn* shall be 
peYmittM -^n^i%ittle ,*a*er *rtH 
not -ditt^rtKtt^ jc^ *j0j6hilng' >re^ 
denoes tn the Ticinrty. 
t3) Signr-v-mtUched to 3uHd-
ings. Any-exterior Jilgn displayed 
shall pertain jOnlT°io * use con-
ducted within the building or lot 
or shall appettaln^to the lease or 
sale4 of the property, such sign 
shafi be attabhsd Hat against a 
'wall of "the bntlrttng or the en-
closed -wall, fence or hedge and 
parallel -to Jfes^ fcortsontal dimen* 
skm^JTlat-Sign area lor the front 
of the building shall be two square 
feet for eaeh-«ne loot of frontage 
wrth a*nudctewnn of one hundred 
square feet, and a maximum of 
ontUitaadced square feet- of sign 
area-onencfa of the other sides of 
the butknng; 
*a^SfeH£^saanraeesr^ 
opies Xrmr*Xumgkng rstxeef&igfct-
of^ Waya aftifloeus OC-I, -end.3W. 
than»-two^&afeiqf/^tdttt « « • -not 
to tlie enrt Use, jeaet-%e twelve 
leet Above the gixwasfl or mie-
walk and may not be ^ajusuuetec 
hasher than ttoirt^-frfe leet above 
thw.;sroun&«cr * 
and new/gaei nay escseJST five 
tiiatlkgjaial ffcfauaiaa) 1km, bat 
aa*e3«co**iei*<tWicV^ 
a***; Traafeh^paOer*aal^«eldg-
TresXhe O y a^ CCTatcWM/^ The 
insarsno* smtfliw*?1*tlie-amount 
ot/<B>aaar,ptf<pirtyi' -*aJha#e -^aftd 
51M0O-. pub*ek^fce«ty. « t»e 
tinataa*:jji^r^reoewal -*f7«» 
l n M a ^ ; y ^ > V ^ ^ ^ ^ 
bu i amwaalgiltliaf ttiti lifta^anbf ^ 
in >^lla^M^4ia^esgilNr^aTr- ' 
imO ^eMgew^ Bul>dtoal©n. One 
la slim « ^ temporary na-
ture tor> eadh taporeyee subdHri-
siem une>er^ d^evft1apajent, may be 
approved provided saeh signs 
shatf tMt eJfeee&3e oomvAned total 
ejreatasrf&undretf-eo^jare feet for 
amy onycsubdivlsiop and'tnalf ito 
one aYgn shalTnuceeed xme hund-
red scrinme-aeet -la^erea, The Xo-
cation afraid signs shall be wttb-
iitr*th*;^ Ribdtv**too and each that 
sa*a,^ signs->wiB s^it no time inter-
fere wtth orr>ebstiruet the vision 
along inieisectiag streets 
•<aw- 3ufWrig^permlt Fees for 
Sign*: *» -
Lee*!ta«* far; „ JNo (Pee 
$2fc#* «o JBflM)o $2*0 
[More ttunr *»ft&* 4O WO.W *.*tf 
tHe*«:*a\aa ;#*00c*e to f7&>+0*M 
Mam a * n t * » i t » «ui*ej60''ff:69 
Eatfr «Wvd1t»aaaU jaWST'or 
feafetfojt tiasrewf l^L! ^ 8 W 
'40*5-1. ©oner Operated" Dry 
neairfny FnlrtHi1aaaii<L 
-ia) - Requlis aeuiitg. Ucensmg: 
ttX Goiavuiigisled dry cleaning 
eojaipTaentotocatiflMB must Jbe ap-
ppef*dv by "Sher^Flaaning "0am* 
Tnamfctmr^ pravrgtu* sastafirtaorr HUT 
1
 -^ pittr'-^ ftiswxng 
* * * * * * 
,^ ak- i n n i i e ^ l i ^ a n not be 
oecapted 
Oeneral 
The sorveat shal] be exor-
ea m elosed containers, and must 
oe uauslerred from the euntstrr-
w an a hne tree of leaks, all 
ssaraeje fiiiilllMsa lor eefvent, ex-
>>-! * * r-
s - l 
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THE-DKVELOPME-NT ORDINANCE 
OF 
COALVILLE CITY, ITAH 
DECEMBER J^S3 
SIGNS 
8.1 Standards 
All signs shall conform to the requirements of this chapter. Temporary signs, described 
in and conforming Co, the standards in the folloving chart may be erected without a permit. 
All other signs require the issuance of a permit before placement unless specifically exempted 
Type/Use 
1. Temporary 
a* Real Estate. 
b. Construction 
c* Political 
d. Community, Public 
Events 
2.- Permanent/Institutiona1 
a. Church, School Bulletin 
Board, flat wall or free 
standing 
b. Home Occupation, flat 
wall, window or free 
standing 
c. Residential Name Plate 
flat wall or free standing 
3. Commercial Signs 
a. Window 
b. Flat Wall 
c. Free Standing 
d. Moving 
«• -Roof-Top 
l . "Pro jec t ing^WaTl 
g. Tow-In 
h. Awnings 
4. Directory signs for 
public safety and 
convenience 
SIGH STANDARDS 
Time Limit 
12 months 
During active 
construction 
60 days' before, 
14 days after 
election 
14 days 
5 years 
5 years 
5 years 
30 days 
8.2 WuUIbHm**fH!> 
1U1 HUllUwluj, l)\JLU Ul SI 
tfexii Size 
20 S«._Ft« 
20 Sq. Ft. 
6 Sq: Ft. 
20 Sq. Ft. 
60 Sq. Ft. 
6 Sq. Ft. 
6 Sq. Ft. 
20% of window 
area 
120 Sq. Ft. 
.120 Sq. -Ft. 
120 Sq. Ft. 
±*v « q ^ r C 
^ 0 Sq. F t . 
10Z of t o t a l 
awning 
6 Sq. F t . 
Maximum 
*u«ber. Spec ia l 
Allowed / Conditions 
H_per_4irxiperty 
1 per. bldg. s i t e 
Unlimited number and 
may be located off 
premises 
Unlimited number and 
may be located off 
premises 
I per frontage 
I per home occupation 
1 per residence, exempt 
from permit 
i per frontage 
1 per frontage 
1 per frontage 
I—per—frontage-
T~per~frontage 
1 p e r f rontage 
Must c l e a r s idewalk 
by 8 F t . 
As needed, exempt from 
permit 
W * * ** 
Signs which obstruct free and clear ^ vision at street intersections, which may, by 
reason of position, shape, or color interfere with, obstruct the view of, or be 
confused with any authorized traffic sign, signal, or device; or which makes use 
of the words, "STOP", "LOOK", "DANGER", or any word(s) or symbols, etc. in such 
manner as to interfere with, mislead, or confuse traffic. 
8-1 
8-3 Setback 
All signs must be sat back at least five (5 feet from property lines > except in the 
General Commercial Zone (GC-1). 
8.4 Premlt Required 
Unless otherwise provided herein* no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged 
unt i l the sign has-been apgrroirod and a permit issued by tha^Zonjji^dtitnlgtrator^ 
Sign permit* Jagi;*alld for otjpariod of f ive (SJ^yaara and are'eubiecc'to reneief. 
Applica^onJEorslgn permiti^sbail be aade to the Zoning Arfmini sttyfor and aba 11 
include a drawing showing £faanlea Ign and location of the proposed stgn(s),, 
8-5 Fee 
The City Council shal l establ ish a fee schedule for permanent sign permits. 
8.6 Lighting of Signs 
No spotlight, flood light, luminous tubes or lighted sign shall be installed 
in any way which will permit the direct rays of such light to penetrate into 
any residential zone or onto aay property used for residential purposes• 
8.7 Existing Signs 
No sign erected before the adoption of this Ordinance shall be moved to a new 
location on the lot or building or enlarged or replaced unless it complies 
with the provisions of this Ordinance. 
8-2 
Chapter 8 
SIGNS 
a^ i Standards 
AXl signs shall conform to the requirements of thdLs 
chapter. Temporary signs,, described in and conforming 
tor the standards in the following chart may be erected 
without a permit. All other signs require the issuance 
of a permit before placement unless specifically 
exempted* 
Type/Use 
Conditions 
1. Temporary 
a. Real Estate 
b. Construction 
c. Political 
d. Community, 
Public Events 
Time- Limit 
SIGN STANDARDS 
Maximum 
Number Special 
Maximum Size A l l o w e d 
12 Months 
During active 
Construction 
60 days before, 
14 days after 
election 
14 days 
20 Sq. Ft. 
20 Sq. Ft. 
6 Sq. Ft. 
20 Sq. Ft. 
1 per Property 
1 per bldg. site 
Unlimited number 
may be located of; 
premises 
Unlimited number 
may be .located of; 
premises. 
2. Permanent/ 
Institutional 
a. Church, School 5 years 
Bulletin Board, 
flat wall or free 
standing 
b. Home 
Occupational, flat 5 years 
wall, window or 
free standing 
c. Residential 
Name Plate, flat 
wall or free standing 
3. Commercial Sign 5 years 
a* Window-
b.- Flat wall 
c. Free Standing 
d. Moving 
f. Project Wall 
g. Tow-In 30 days 
h. Awnings 
60 Sq. Ft. 1 per frontage 
6 Sq. 
6 Sq. 
20% of 
area 
120 Sq. 
120 Sq. 
120 Sq. 
120 Sq. 
20 Sq. 
40 Sq. 
107. of 
Ft. 
Ft. 
windows 
Vt. 
Ft. 
Ft. 
Ft. 
Ft 
Ft. 
total 
1 per home 
occupation 
1 per residence, 
exempt from perml" 
1 per frontage 
1 per frontage 
1 per frontage 
1 per 'frontage 
1 per frontage 
1 per frontage 
Must clear sidewa. 
58 
4. Directory sign for 
public safety and 
convenience 
awnin-g 
6 sq. Ft 
by 8 ft. 
As needed, exempt 
from permit 
8.2 Prohibited Signs 
The following types od signs are prohibited: 
A. Off premises signs, except as listed above. 
B. Signs which obstruct free and clear vision at street 
intersections^ which may, by reason of position, shape, 
or color interfere with, obstruct the view of, or be 
confused with any authorised traffic sign, signal, or 
device; or which ' makes use? of the words, "STOP", 
"LOOK", "DANGER", or any word <s> or symbols, etc. in 
such manner as to interfere with, mislead, or confuse 
traffic. 
8.3 Setback 
All signs must be set back at lea^t five (5) feet from property 
lines, except in the General Commercial Zone (C-l). 
8.4 Permit Required 
Unless otherwise provided herein, no sign shall be erected, 
relocated or enlarged until the sign has been approved and a 
permit issued by the Zoning Administrator. Sign permits are 
valid for a period of Five (5) years and are subject to renewal. 
Application for sign permits shall be made to the Zoning 
Administrator and shall include a drawing showing the design and 
location of the proposed sign (s). 
8.5 Fee 
The City Council 
sign permits. 
shall establish a fee schedule for permanent 
8.6 Lighting of Signs 
No spotlight, flood light, luminous tubes or lighted sign shall 
be installed in any way which•will permit the direct rays of such 
light to penetrate into any residential zone or onto any property 
used for residential purposes. 
8.7 Existing Signs 
No signs erected before the adoption of this ordinance shall be 
moved to a new location on the lot or building or enlarged or 
replaced unless it complies with the provisions of this 
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>ALVILLE CITY CORPORATION 
- COALVILLE, UTAH 
Data-
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9
 M 
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etery —~^ -<—11 
Total ^a oA 
Fond or Remarks. 
/ ^ -•£<? ,f fl & ^ 
/ • w Treasurer 
By_ 
260 
> 2 4, 198U 
Regular CouncxJ. Meeting. 
;;Bo5irr 
/Tie fLAiod wa* di*cu**ed at thi* time. ClifLton "Babe" Blonqui*t 
$r. *howed a map ofc, where the bridge on 125 SaAt 50 North wa* taken 
out and where the bend in tixe river bed ofi the park keep* washing, 
away. When he meet* at the State Capital on {Hood di*ctAter, they 
need a dollar jLigiuie OA to the damage in the County. He will give 
the amount ofc. 1.5 mLUJion dollar* which included the City1* two 
trouble area*. 
A* {Lot the gnandAtand in the park, the City maintenance worker* 
will keep trying to contact the County Building, 7n*pector before 
anything con be done on thi*. 
Clifcton "Babe" BlonquiAt $r. mentioned that he haA al*o been contact-
ed about the dLitche* in Coalville City. There i* a question OA 
to who own* the ditche*, Coalville City, Summit County on. the Ditch 
Company. Regardle** o£ who iA re*pon*ible9 a culvert going under 
the /toad in fcront ofc Ellen Salmon* at 83 £a*t 100 North need* to 
be replaced. The County will help on thiA i/L they are needed. 
The Public Hearting on the Sign Ordinance Change wa* at thi* time. 
Woodrow Neil*on, Planning Commi**ion wa* p/te*ent {ion. thi*. Ronald 
K. Hawkin* mentioned that it had been /lecommended by the Planning 
Commi**ion to in<yiea*e the *quare Rootage on Commercial Projection 
Wall Sign* firom 20 *quare fceet to 75 *quare fieet. Thi* information 
i* in Chapter 8, 8.1 3jL page 8-1 o£ "THE D6V6WPM6NT ORDINANCE 
OF C0ALV3LLL CJTy UTAH" December 1983. Mayor Mertyn W. $ohn*on 
aAked i£ there wa* anyone present who objected to the Sign Ordinance 
Change. No one in attendance objected. Ronald K. Hawkin* made 
a motion to accept the recommendation o£ the Planning. Commi**ion 
to change the Projecting Walt *ign {Lrom 20 *quare {Leet to 75 *quare 
fieet. Colleen R. Sargent *econded the motion. All aye*. Ronald 
K. Hawkin* will check to *ee ijL it ha* to be advertised. 
W®$%^^ „hai * been 
j g g g g ^ ^ ved v the 6&?'fr&* 
Leon Simi*ter came in about the mobile home that will replace the 
*matl home belonging to Amy Potter at 118 North 50 6a*t. He WOA 
told that he neecU to get with William M. Qudd, Building. Jn*pector 
to get a building permit. 
Dannie Pollock, DM$ft Engineering, gave a prog^e** report at the 
*ewer plant. The project i* 28% complete. The contractor* are 
*titt ahead ofc *chedule. There have been a couple men apply ^or 
the plant operator1* po*ition but referenced need to be checked 
out and qualification* approved by the State. Dannie 1A to check 
into *ome *eepage at the baAe ofc a wall at the plant. The Li£t 
Station by Florence Wilde WOA di*cuA*ed. The present one need* 
replaced or plan* need to be made to UAe a gravity line. Dannie 
will check into both theAe method* fcor funding. 
Su160 
Removed 
8a 9.00 
Flying 
500.00 
Flying 
550.00 
Flying J 
Su161 
Removed 
9a 
Crandall 
300.00 
Executive 
605-tfCT 400.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Executive 
440.00 
Executive 
484.00 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
700.00 
4,385.00 
2,335.00 
3,565.00 
3,235.50 
5,307.15 
4,653.00 
6,133.84 
5,940.00 
3,293.00 
3,293.00 
2,525.00 
1,925.00 
2,525.00 
2,525.00 
Annual 
63,685.80 
0.00 
55,836.00 
0.00 
73,606.08 
0.00 
71,280.00 
0.00 
39,516.00 
0.00 
39,516.00 
0.00 
30,300.00 
0.00 
23,100.00 
0.00 
30,300.00 
0.00 
30,300.00 
Difference 
5,970.54 
5,234.63 
6,900.57 
6,682.50 
5,927.40 
5,927.40 
4,545.00 
3,465.00 
4,545.00 
4,545.00 
Annual 
Difference 
i | j iS 
71,646.53 
0.00 
62,815.50 
0.00 
82,806.84 
0.00 
80,190.00 
0.00 
71,128.80 
0.00 
71,128.80 
0.00 
54,540.00 
0.00 
41,580.00 
0.00 
54,540.00 
0.00 
54,540.00 
0.00 4,705.00 1,324.00 
Grand Tota 52,340.49 457,439.88 53,743.04 644,916.47 
644,916.47 
Difference I 187,476.59 
16 Years Life of Leases 
Cost to Remove 
Total Damages 
387,840.00 
4,000.00 
579,316.59 
4a 
ummitCo Lmb 
400.00 
^UttiGtrce 
532.40 
Removed 
5.00 
Removed 
5a 
Holiday Jolly Roger 
400.00 350.00 
Peppermill Jolly/Porter 
500.00 
Peppermill 
600.00 
Leesure 
492.00 
Porter 
250.00 
_Porter 
590.00- - 250.00 
Doubletree Porter 
645.00 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
250.00 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
6.00 
eber Valley 
400.00 
Radisson 
600.00 
Radisson 
600.00 
Factory 
600.00 
Factory 
650.00 
Su121 
Removed Removed 
6a 7.00 
Yarrow 
400.00 
Rodeway Yarrow 
175.00 400.00 
Rodeway Yarrow 
175.00 500.00 
Yarrow 
550.00 
Yarrow 
605.00 
Coalville Pott Yarrow 
385.00 605.00 
Coalville Pott Yarrow 
385.00 595.00 
Yarrow 
595.00 
Flyng W Yarrow 
350.00 595.00 
Flying W Removed 
350.00 Removed 
Flying W Removed 
350.00 Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
7a 
Moore 
300.00 
Classic 
375.00 
Classic 
412.50 
Classic 
453.75 
Classic 
400.00 
Classic 
400.00 
Classic 
400.00 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Removed 
Su140 
8.00 
Butko 
400.00 
Butko 
400.00 
Butko 
418.00 
Butko 
418.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
610.00 
Flying J 
610.00 
1,456.40 2,335.00 1,242.00 2,450.00 1,995.00 4,045.00 2,441.25 
Para 13 Gar 
Su010 
Removed 
1.00 
1981 
1982 Billy's 
560.00 
1983 Billy's 
560.00 
1984 Billy's 
560.00 
1985 
SuO: 
Bell 
Beil 
Bell 
T986 Removed Belf 
Removed 
1987 Removed 
Removed 
1988 Removed 
Removed 
1989 Removed 
Removed 
1990 Removed 
Removed 
1991 Removed 
Removed 
1992 Removed 
Removed 
1993 Removed 
Removed 
1994 Removed 
Removed 
Bell 
Bell 
Bell 
Beil 
Bell 
Bell 
Bell 
Bell 
20 
2.00 
Bell 
300.00 
Beil 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00-
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
1995 Removed Vacant 
Removed 
2a 
Evanson 
400.00 
Park City. 
Su040 
3.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
500.00 
McDonalds 
500.00 
3a 
McDonalds Maverik 
Su100 
4.00 
Homes 
400.00 
Home's 
400.00 
Homes 
440.00 
Homes 
484.00 
Homes 
484.00 
Homes 
523.00 
Homes 
—695:00 500.00 695.00- 564.84 
Park City 
680.00 
McDonalds Maverik 
400.00 
Robertson McDonalds 
600.00 400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
McDonalds 
400.00 
695.00 
McDonalds Whirl Inn 
400.00 300.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Homes 
565.00 
Total 1,680.00 4.050.00 1.975.00 5,500.00 14.335.00 
Para 13 Damages 
$ Materials 
Ave Profit 
Total 
Goodwill 
2x 
10000/YR 
11,864.00 
23,728.00 
120,000.00 
Total 143,728.00 
•<0. 
Grant M&cfarlane, Jr. (2040) 
Janes L. Barker (0205) 
Kira E. Hacfarlane f7Q81) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1912 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 209 
P»0. Box 680X06 
Parfc City, Utah 84O68-O106 
Tel: (80X) 
3y-
F I L E D 
^EB 1 1996 
Clem of Surnnm Co^ i cy 
DwHyOtrfc 
jMr-
IB THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COALVILLE CITY, 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
ALVIN R. LUNDGRElf, dba 
LUNDGREN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
et al., 
Defendants• 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
Civil No. 82-039-6856 
Judge Brian 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff, Coalville City, 
cross-appeals to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that portion of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree dated October 26, 
1995 that awarded the Defendant Alvin R. Lundgren pre-judgment 
interest. Plaintiff further seeks award of additional attorney's 
fees incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this \ ^ day of February, 1996. 
usa<C WL 
Kira E. Macfarlai 
Attorney for P la int i f f 
1082 
